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ON THE ROAD TO RADICAL REFORM:'
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF UNGER'S
POLITICS°
By RICHARD F. DEVLIN*
Two aims drive this essay. The first is to provide the reader with an
accessible, yet relatively comprehensive, introduction to Roberto
Mangabeira Unger's social and legal theory. The second aim is to
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Unger's most recent scholarship
and to make some suggestions as to where he goes awry. In particular,
the author draws several parallels between the Ungerian enterprise and
that of some feminists. The central motivation of the essay is to keep
the critical conversation between male radicals and feminists open. To
this end, the author posits the possibility of mutually beneficial
contributions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two basic purposes underlie this review. The first is an
attempt to provide an accessible, yet reasonably comprehensive,
introduction to the social and legal theory of Roberto Mangabeira
Unger, particularly as it is developed in his recently published three
volume series Politics: A Work in Constructive Social Theory. The
second purpose is to evaluate both the strengths and weaknesses of
the Ungerian enterprise and, more particularly, to indicate where, in
my opinion, he has gone wrong. In pursuing the latter, I will draw
upon the contributions of recent feminist social theory.
2
2 A caveat must be introduced at the outset. I am very conscious of the dangers involved
in a process in which a man discusses feminism. What follows, I hope, is neither masculinist
ventriloquism nor imperial scholarship. Richard Delgado describes the latter as white (or,
in this case, male) analysis that is built upon "factual ignorance or naivete, ... failure of
empathy, and inability to share values, desires and perspectives of the population whose rights
are under consideration." See 'The Imperial Scholar. Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature" (1984) 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561 at 568. In the light of these concerns, let
me cautiously say that what is said in this paper is not said as a feminist because I am not
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To achieve these aims, the essay is divided into six subsections.
In Part II, I will attempt to provide a political and philosophical
backdrop for Unger's work in order to indicate the nature of the
problem that he and others - feminists, for example - are
attempting to come to terms with. This I call the Paradox of the
Twilightenment. In Part III, I provide a self-contained overview of
each of the three books that make up Politics. Part IV outlines
some political and philosophical points of intersection between
Unger and elements of the feminist enterprise and suggests the
viability of a fruitful interchange. On this foundation, Part V
provides several examples of the way in which critical theory t la
Unger may be of some utility for feminist reconstruction. Part VI,
on the other hand, identifies, from a feminist perspective, some of
the very serious weaknesses of Unger's theory as developed in
Politics and makes some suggestions as to how they might be
remedied. The conclusion returns to a brief discussion of why it
may be worthwhile facilitating an exchange between feminist and
Ungerian social theory.
II. A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: A SNAPSHOT OF
THE TWILIGHTENMENT
A- The Paradox of Freedom Embedded in Domination
Our post-industrial, patriarchal condition disconcerts because
it disempowers. Many of us are disempowered because our society
has been unable to resolve the tension between freedom and
equality on the one hand, and domination and subordination on the
other, in a manner that allows all of us to fulfill our potentials as
human beings. Put differently, a fundamental problem with
contemporary society is that some people's freedom is the cause of
sure if it is possible - or desirable - for a man to be feminist. Yet at the same time, I do
believe that it is legitimate for men to enter into conversations with feminists, and that such
conversations can be for their mutual benefit. For a further discussion of this issue, see
"Nomos and Thanatos (Part A). The Killing Fields: Modern Law and Legal Theory" (1989)
12 Dal L.J. 297 and "Nomos and Thanatos (Part B). Feminism as Jurisgenerative
Transformation or Resistance Through Partial Incorporation?" (1990) 13 Dal. LJ.
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Nomos and Thanatos (Part B)].
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other people's subordination. This I call the Paradox of the
Twilightenment.
Those of us who inhabit the rich Euro-yanqui societies confront
an existential paradox: when we compare our cultural situation with
those of the Third World and of communist societies, it appears that
in relation to the bench-marks of freedom and domination we are
ahead all the way. However, when we begin to seriously reflect
upon our everyday realities, the finer textures of our intimate and
civic relations, a discomforting feeling of unfulfillment begins to
emerge. When we critically evaluate our interpersonal relations,
whether in the realms of employment or our men'; vulnerable
connections, it becomes apparent that domination and subordination,
hierarchy and dependence, privilege and inequality are more
pervasive than we might want to admit, and are, perhaps, even
constitutive. Moreover, when we examine our political lives it seems
that, in the main, our participation is minimal and our impact
marginal. Freedom, although much touted, is seldom seen. It is
more closely related to our ability as consumers to purchase, than it
is to effective democratic participation in the polity.
Thus, the normalcy of our societies, although superficially
attractive when compared to what else appears to be available, is on
closer inspection profoundly disturbing. It obscures the per-
vasiveness of domination, subordination, inequality, and harm
through an ideology of freedom - an apologetic ideology that
rationalizes domination, rather than challenging it. Several of the
pieces I am currently working on are attempts to interrogate these
connections between domination and subordination and to raise the
possibility of theory and practice that could be otherwise to make
freedom and domination, not only antithetical, but also incompatible.
B. Theses of the Enlightenment
Protest about the impoverished state of our contemporary
context, although necessary, is an inadequate foundation for social
transformation. As feminism demonstrates, consciousness is not
changed circumstances. The experiential disillusionment is only one
facet of problems that run much deeper, problems which, I think,
can be traced to the politico-philosophical roots of western, liberal
1990]
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democratic society. I want to suggest that three interrelated ideas
which inspired the project of the Enlightenment have contributed
to our failure to uncouple domination and freedom. The project of
progressive actors must be to transcend these pervasive ideas, to
demonstrate how the noble dream of the Enlightenment has become
the nightmare of the Twilightenment, and to work towards a vision
for the reconstruction of the nature and relations of human
interactions.
The three central ideas that are integral to the project of the
Enlightenment are: (1) the priority of the right over the good, with
the correlative underemphasis on construction of desirable societies;
(2) an excessive concern with the autonomy of the individual, at the
expense of her constitutive connections with others; and (3) a
correlative of the former two, a relativism or scepticism about how
we could live better lives, both individually and together.
C. The Three "D's"
The scepticism sponsored by the Enlightenment has had the
deleterious effect of what might be called the three "D's":
distraction, despondence, and disempowerment. By distraction, I mean
the seemingly irrepressible dynamic for those of us who live in
technologically sophisticated societies to adapt, invent, and consume
gadgetry that, in and of itself or as a medium for some other
vicarious activity, will allow us to continue our collectively self-
imposed myopia. Distraction contributes to the cult of self-
fulfillment,3 thereby inducing political impotence. Despondence is
interconnected with distraction in so far as the latter suggests the
limits of the good life and the pacification of our capacity to be
socially involved. It goes beyond distraction in that it is a
consequence of a resignation to our apparent puniness in relation to
the great world events. The fatalistic tendencies of such a stance
result in what might be called the political can't. Disempowerment
is the politico-psychological consequence of distraction and
despondence. It is a feeling of political irrelevance or marginality,
3False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Social Democracy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) at 543ff. [hereinafter False Necessity].
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a denial of our creative abilities as human beings, an unjustifiable
surrender to the fallacy that the actual is the inevitable.
To summarize, the foregoing discussion of the three tenets of
the Enlightenment, in combination with the three "D's," provides us
with a snapshot of what some call "the post-modern condition."4 It
is what I call the Twilightenment with its fundamental contradiction:
the embeddedness of domination in freedom.
III. POLITICS
All is not gloom and doom, however. I do believe that there
is still space for reconstruction and an escape from the
Twilightenment. I find traces of this hope in both feminism and
critical theory. In this review, I want to focus my thoughts through
a critical overview of Unger's most recent three volumes, but filtered
through the critical prism of feminist analysis.
5
Unger is important for at least two reasons. Although he is a
law professor at Harvard, his scholarship and activities have had an
impact far beyond the legal community. Since 1975 he has
published seven books,6 some of which when reviewed have been
4 J.-F. Lyotard, The Post Modem Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota, 1984).
5 A second caveat concerning feminism must be identified. Although I use the terms
feminism and feminist, I am of course aware that there are many feminisms and feminists
and that they can not be reduced to a unified essentialist group. Indeed, one of the biggest
debates with feminism - at least of the academic variety - is the question of whether there
is a series of commonalities between all feminists, in spite of their differences, or whether
feminism, because of its consciousness of difference, is better understood as a radical
pluralism. See, generally, the last several issues of Signs. Having said that, I do think that
at the present historical moment there are a series of themes that are common to many
feminists, and it is upon these that I draw: see S. Farganis, The Social Reconstruction of the
Feminine Character (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986).
6 Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1975) [hereinafter Knowledge]; Law in
Modem Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory (New York: Free Press, 1976) [hereinafter
Law in Modem Society]; Passion: An Essay on Personality (New York: Free Press, 1984)
[hereinafter Passion]; The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1986) [hereinafter Critical Legal Studies]; Social Theory: Its Situation and its
Task (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) [hereinafter Social Theory]; False
Necessity, supra, note 3; Plasticity into Power: Comparative-Historical Studies on the Institutional
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compared - favourably and unfavourably - with Kant, Hegel, and
Marx. At the age of thirty-nine, he may well have established
himself as one of the most important thinkers of the late twentieth
century. Secondly, Unger has aligned himself with and has been
pivotal to the emergence of the Critical Legal Studies Movement.
Crits get a lot of bad press as nihilists, trashers, and jurisprudential
anarchists who can critique but do little to suggest how things might
be improved. To some extent that is true. Unger, however, goes
beyond critique. The three volumes reviewed in this essay are his
most coherent efforts to date. The subtitle to Politics is: "A Work
in Constructive Social Theory." And I think they have much to
offer.
A. Social Theory: Its Situation and its Task
Social Theory is, perhaps, the most inaccessible of the three
volumes, at least for lawyers. However, I want to emphasize at the
outset that the difficulty should not be identified as the predictable
scholarly ruminations and philosophical flights of fantasy of a
nameless academic at an elite university. Rather, the source of the
unfamiliarity is to be located in the enormity of the enterprise upon
which Unger embarks. By drawing on his own prehistory, his
acknowledged failure to have a progressive impact upon Brazilian
politics in the mid 1980s, Unger attempts to come to terms with the
question of why contemporary ideas and ideology (for example,
Marxism) fail to provide the requisite inspiration and motivation -
not to mention feasible strategies - for transformative political
praxis. He argues that such an inquiry, if serious, requires a
sweeping critical reflection upon, not only the politics of the late
twentieth century, for that would only scratch the surface, but also
our received epistemological traditions. For Unger, knowledge and
politics are mutually constitutive. The viability of a transgressive
politics that can serve as an alternative to both liberalism and
communism is dependent upon a reconceptualization of knowledge.
As he suggests, we must work towards "another way of seeing and
Conditions of Economic and Military Success (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)
[hereinafter Plasticity].
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talking."7  Thus, the difficulty of his work is explained by the
essential nature of the enterprise.
8
Primarily, Social Theory is a critical analysis of the
methodologies, paradigms, practices, and, most importantly, the
deeply embedded assumptions of contemporary social theory.
Unger's overarching thesis is that conventional wisdom and
knowledge are structurally disempowering. He proceeds to found
this claim on the argument that over the last several centuries our
greatest thinkers and social movements9 have all operated, explicitly
or implicitly, on an assumption of what he variously calls
"inevitability," "naturalism," or "necessitarianism." That is, they tend
to see science, human nature, and our social, economic, and political
relations as having certain characteristics that are fixed, immutable,
or permanent. The reason why such a viewpoint is disempowering
is that it suggests that there is a certain natural order that is pre-
ordained and unchallengeable and therefore immune from human
intervention. The consequence is "intellectual entropy, ... social
stagnation,"10 "frozen politics,"11 and a "perpetuation of the
conditions of hierarchy ... dependence and domination."
12
Unger provides a variety of examples of the repressive impact
of necessitarianism on natural science (cosmology and natural
7 Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 130.
8 Alexandra Dobrowolsky has suggested to me a second reason why Unger's work may
appear difficult, a reason that relates more to the reader than the author. Referring to
feminist literary criticism, Dobrowolsky suggests that we tend to read in one of two different
modes: as "text-rubbers' or as "data-gatherers.' Our style of reading, in this view, tends to
be functionally specific effecting an intellectual division of labour between the
recreational/pleasurable and the labourial/instrumental. We tend to use one or the other
depending on the context and the subject matter. They are functionally dichotomous. For
some readers, it may be that the interpretive problem with Unger is that his style of writing
requires both text-rubbing and data-gathering simultaneously, an ability we find difficult to
develop, especially for lawyers who are deliberately trained to generate data and eliminate
verbiage. For a further discussion of the importance of language, see False Necessity, supra,
note 3 at 430-32.
9 1n particular, he identifies three "great secular doctrines of emancipation: liberalism,
socialism and communism." See Social Theoy, supra, note 6 at 1.
10 Ibid. at 2.
11 Ibid. at 11.
12 Ibid. at 1.
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history), positivist and empiricist social science, economics,
epistemology, and historiography. However, perhaps surprising to
some, he expends his greatest efforts on Marxist theory and
communist practice. He posits that the reason why traditional
communism has failed is because of Marxism's deep structural,
necessitarian belief in economic determinism, that is, the credo that
human emancipation will be achieved after the revolution
necessitated by the economic polarization inherent in capitalism.
From Unger's perspective, the problem with this analysis is fourfold.
Firstly, Marx's central concept - capitalism - is conceptually flawed,
being simultaneously over and under inclusive. It explains both too
little and too much of world history. Secondly, the Marxian analysis
of an inexorable, discrete, and lawlike sequence of modes of
production (each with their own supposedly unique set of internal
laws) is descriptively inaccurate and explanatorily deficient. Thirdly,
the Marxist faith in revolution is misplaced, desperate, and
disempowering, for it is dependent upon "government shattering
events like war and occupation,"13 unlikely scenarios for the rich
North Atlantic societies. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly,
these theoretical errors have had disastrous practical consequences
in that the belief in economically determined inevitability, with its
assumption of an incorrigible typecast script, tends to render
irrelevant the political and imaginative significance of human agency.
Thus, for Unger, knowledge is political to its core in so far as its
unquestioned assumptions - in this case historical materialism's
deeply embedded necessitarian premise that "there is a pre-
established plot to social and historical life"14 - have a dramatic
impact upon the issues identified, the questions asked, the
methodologies invoked, the answers sought, and the practices
generated.
Unger is quick to point out, though, that the rejection of
"necessitarian illusions" does not inevitably result in "nihilistic
13 Aid. at 164.
14 bid. at 136.
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impotencells or "intellectual or political abdication."16  To the
contrary, he argues that by means of this critique we can begin to
unpack the parameters and possibilities of a reconstructive agenda.1 7
Politics is a "polemic with a constructive point."18  For example,
although he is extremely critical of the necessitarian impulses of "a
dead man's doctrines,"19 he also recognizes that there already exists
within Marx's enterprise "the beginnings of an antidote,"20  the
rudiments of political and epistemological reconstruction:
Marx stated the relation between enlightenment and emancipation from false necessity
in the most powerful and uncompromising way. The social world was not a natural
order, but a domain of collective struggle, constraint, and acceptance. The material
relations of society were real relationships of domination and dependence among
people. The whole structure of society was the expression of temporary constraints and
particular contests rather than part of the inherent nature of things. Economic growth,
which had once required oppression, would soon make it superfluous. The role of
social thought, as an accomplice of emancipatory social practice, was to demystify
society and to reveal it to itself.21
Where Marx and Marxists had gone wrong was to turn historical
materialism into a positivistic science, thereby unconsciously
deradicalizing its emancipatory potential.
The primary purpose therefore of the first volume of Politics
is to strive towards the evocation and articulation of an alternative
conception of knowledge and politics. Unger argues that naturalism
is, in fact, a hangover from the pre-modern - the ancient and/or
feudalistic - worlds with their notions of status, closure,
foundationalism, and essentialism. Modernism, however, rejects such
a static and scripted viewpoint of the world and adopts as its central
15 Ibid. at 137.
16 Ibid. at 149.
17 Unger does recognize that there are certain social critics, for example Foucault, who
would agree with much of his critique, but who would equally virulently reject his
reconstructive agenda as a capitulation to metatheory. Though he does not trash these "ultra-
theorists," he does accuse them of "unrestrained negativism." Ibid. at 165-70, 150.
18 Ibid. at 200.
19 Ibid. at 99.
2 0 Ibid. at 229.
21 Ibid. at 138.
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theme the challengeability of all assumptions and the constructed
and non-permanent nature of social interaction.2 2 The difference
can be schematized as follows:
Pre-modem social theory
necessitarianism
natural
essential
permanent
settled
inevitability
closure
finite
apolitical/non-contestable
disempowerment
Modem social theory
anti-necessitarianism
constructed
artificial
contingent
unsettled
plasticity
openness
infinite
it's all politics/it's all up for
grabs
empowerment
However, we must be careful not to understand the foregoing
schematization as a mere exercise in reversal and inversion, the
simple replacement or elimination of historical necessity by historical
contingency. That would be to commit the fatal error of "denying
the reality of constraint,"23 and thereby succumbing to the myopia of
naive voluntarism. Rather, what is. contemplated is a
reconceptualization of both necessitarianism and contingency and
their mutual relationship, a consciousness that the distinction is
relative, not absolute - a continuum and not a dichotomy. The
distinction is therefore still important, but now for very different
reasons.24 I will return to this point in the next section where I
22 In fact, in this volume Unger goes further to develop the outline of an alternative
explanatory social theory, one that recognizes the distinction between "formative contexts and
formed routines," but one which, at the same time, denies any necessary permanence to the
former and posits that the distinction between contexts and routines is relative, not absolute.
See ibid. at 151-52. For the purposes of this review, I think it is appropriate to reserve a
discussion of these ideas to the next section where he develops these thoughts in much greater
detail.
23 Ibid. at 173.
24 Unger makes this point most explicitly through his discussions of natural science.
Ibid., c. 7.
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discuss his theory of "formative contexts and formed routines. '25 To
summarize, Unger sees himself as the archmodernist, a latter-day
crusader who, through his espousal of contextualism, 26 wants to take
"the idea of society as artifact to the hilt"27 and thereby to
emancipate us from the shackles of "false necessity."
Supplementing and driving the first two themes of Social Theory
- the critique of the naturalistic predicament of contemporary social
theory and the evocation of a contextual anti-necessitarian
alternative - there is a third motivating theme, what Unger describes
as the "radical project." Here, Unger's aspiration is that we become
"the architects and critics, rather than the puppets, of the social
worlds in which we live."28 It is tailored to enable us "to seek out
our individual and collective empowerment through the progressive
dissolution of rigid social division and hierarchy and stereotyped
social roles."2
9
In a previous work, Passion,30 Unger traced out a theory of
human nature that runs parallel to many of the themes in Politics.
In that work, Unger argued that we are not passive automatons of
our contexts, that our genius and specificity as human beings is to
be located in our "negative capability," that is, our ability to revise
and/or transcend every constraining context that is foisted upon us.
The history of humankind is the history of breach of context. The
problem with contexts is that they have a propensity to ossify. They
tend to take on a logic and dynamic of their own which, in turn,
conflates the actual with the possible. This process of rigidification
conflicts with and attempts to imprison our negative capability.
Worse still, the stasis induced by the solidification of contexts
25 See section III.B, infra at 655ff.
26 Unger also makes the important point that a modern social theory must be a
contextual social theory, one that recognizes the partiality of its own context, one that is
conscious of its own transience. As I will suggest later, this viewpoint may cause him more
problems than he recognizes. See also, M. Minow, "Partial Justice: Law and Minorities"
(1988) [unpublished manuscript].
27 Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 1.
28 Ibid. at 156.
29 Ibid. at 93.
30 Supra, note 6.
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becomes identified as the natural order by those who exercise power
and privilege. It is therefore utilized to reinforce and legitimize
conditions of inequality, hierarchy, and subordination. An anti-
necessitarian social theory is designed to undercut the political and
philosophical feasibility of such preservative apologetics, so that
everything - including our interpretive assumptions - is "up for
grabs." The Ungerian aspiration is that each and every one of us
may have the possibility "to live as the originals as [we] all feel
[ourselves] to be"31 and achieve our aspirations free from the
constraints of illegitimate hierarchy. This Unger calls "empowerment
through disentrenchment."32
Thus, Unger's ambition, as traced out in the first volume of
Politics, is large: to interrogate, transcend, and replace one
conception of the world with another. Moreover, the articulation of
a radical, anti-necessitarian explanatory social theory is designed to
go "hand in hand'"3 with a more important project: the outline of
a post-Marxist3 4  programme for social reconstruction. This
programme, which is outlined in the second volume, is designed to
nullify the traditional liberal accusation of deconstructive nihilism, by
offering a realizable "vision of alternative institutional forms"35 that
can transcend the achievements, such as they are, of liberalism,
communism, and social democracy. Theory and practice, knowledge
and politics remain at the core of the Ungerian agenda, for as he
argues time and again, "it is all politics."36
31 Ibid. at 214.
32 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 249.
33 Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 6.
34 It is also post-liberal and post-social democratic.
35 Social Theoy, supra, note 6 at 6.
36 Unger elaborates on what he means by this in a footnote:
Throughout this book and its constructive sequel I use the term "politics" in both a
narrower and a broader sense. The narrower sense is the conflict over the mastery and
uses of governmental power. The broader sense is the conflict over the terms of our
practical and passionate relations to one another and over all the resources and
assumptions that may influence these terms. Preeminent among these assumptions arc
the institutional arrangements and imaginative preconceptions that compose a social
framework, context or structure. Governmental politics is only a special case of politics
in this larger sense. In a theory that carries to extremes the view of society as artifact,
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B. False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service
of Radical Democracy
This six hundred and fifty page book provides us with the core
of Unger's reconstructive agenda. It begins with a rehearsal of the
ideas of the first, more theoretical volume - this time describing it
as a "proto-theory"37 - and then proceeds to concretize and
elaborate through an impressive panoply of historical examples. This
volume has two parts: one analytic and explanatory of societies of
the past and present; the other programmatic and suggestive of the
future. Between them they are designed to ensure that we do not
fall prey to "the hallucinatory identification of the actual with the
necessary."
38
1. Explanatory: determinism vs. formative contexts
In the explanatory part, Unger provides us with an account of
the patterns of social interaction that is not dependent upon theories
of necessitarianism. Rather, in order to provide a "corrective to a
contrived sense of natural progression,"39 he argues that we can only
fully understand our past and our present if we see them through
what he calls a theory of "formative context." He defines formative
contexts as "the basic institutional arrangements and imaginative
preconceptions that circumscribe our routine practical or imaginative
activities and conflicts and that resist their destabilizing effects."40
The reason why we would want to comprehend the significance of
this larger notion of politics merges into the conception of society making. The slogan
"It's all politics" adds a further twist to this more inclusive idea. The additional twist
is the notion that this society-making activity follows no preestablished plot and that
its outcomes are not chiefly to be understood as the results of lawlike economic,
organizational, and psychological constraints or overpowering developmental tendencies.
Ibid. at 10.
3 7 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 32.
38 Ibid. at 291.
39 Ibid. at 214.
40 Ibid. at 6-7.
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formative contexts is because of their interconnection with the power
order of any society. Formative contexts underpin both the
possibility and the processes of politics because they provide certain
groups with "a privileged measure of control over the means of
society making: mastery over capital and productive labor, access to
governmental power, and familiarity with the discourses by which we
reimagine society and govern nature. 41
Through a discussion of the Ancient City State Republics,
agrarian-bureaucratic empires, world history, his native Brazil of the
1980s, and, most elaborately, the post-war cycles of reform and
retrenchment of both western and communist societies, Unger argues
that each can only be explained if we see them as a unique
combination of peculiar social forces, none of which can be reduced
to one determinative, overarching, totalistic, ahistorical imperative.
Thus, for example, he is critical of liberalism in that it assumes that
there is a necessary connection between private property, a free
market, freedom of the individual, democracy, and equality. I will
return to this example below.
We must be very careful not to misunderstand Unger's claims
about his theory of formative contexts. His argument is not simply
a reversal of the argument that everything is immutable and
inevitable. The theory of formative contexts recognizes that there
are constraining structures that circumscribe our lived routines,42 but
it also recognizes that no context is total and that the difference
between contexts and routine is relative, not absolute. His ambition
is to change the very meaning of contexts, not just their content, but
also their character, to disconnect them from their essentialist
assumptions, to diminish their "imprisoning quality," and to make
them more open to transience than fixity:
We can never resolve the tension between the need to accept a context and the
inadequacy of all particular contexts. We can nevertheless diminish this tension by our
success at inventing contexts that give us the instruments and opportunities of their own
41 Ibid. at 33.
42 Indeed, elsewhere he appears to accept the appropriateness of contexts when he
discusses what he calls "the paradox of contextuality: our need to settle down to a particular
context and our inability to accept any context in particular as fully satisfactory." Ibid. at 342.
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revision and that thereby help us diminish the contrast between context-preserving
routine and context-transforming struggle.43
Therefore, Unger is not calling for the elimination of contexts,44 for
that would be utopian. Rather, he is attempting to conceive of
"constraint without deep structure '45 and to provide us with a "scale
of revisability"46 that can allow us to evaluate the different structures
according to the extent to which they provide for their own
remaking and their consequential openness to human empowerment:
Formative contexts differ not only in content but in character that is to say, in their
relative degree of entrenchment or immunity to disturbance. The more entrenched
they are, the sharper become the contrasts they establish and uphold between routine
and transformation and the steeper, more rigid, and more influential the social divisions
and hierarchies to which they give rise. Formative contexts enjoy degrees of existence.
This variation matters: the disentrenchment of formative contexts is bound up with
many of our most basic efforts at individual and collective empowerment.
4 7
Consequently, in the Ungerian scheme of things, the institutions and
ideologies of liberal bourgeois democracies are more preferable than
those of European absolutist monarchies because they are more
open to self-revision. By exactly the same measure - i.e., the "scale
of revisability" - his unfolding project of empowered democracy is
preferable to liberal bourgeois democracies in so far as the latter
still bear the mark of naturalism.48
Unger concretizes these rather abstract reflections on the
nature of formative contexts through a discussion of some of the
institutional components of the formative context of western
democracies. He argues that there are four basic institutional
elements of the formative context of late twentieth century western
43 Ibid. at 32.
44 He identifies such a position with "negativistic, existentialist creed" and ultra-theory.
Ibid. at 98.
45 Ibid. at 170.
46 Ibid. at 35.
4 7 Ibid. at 61.
48 Ibid. at 280. Unger provides a variation of this thesis in a later, parallel argument.
In the course of a discussion on the rigidity of differing social hierarchies, he suggests that
"[c]lass hierarchy is not the sole exemplary form of social hierarchy" and indeed that the caste
and the estate are even more ensconced. Ibid. at 306-7.
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democracies: the work-organization complex, the private-rights
complex, the governmental-organization complex, and the
occupational-structure complex.49  Together these interrelated
complexes coalesce into a sort of matrix that sets the terrain and
parameters of social interaction, not only institutionally, but also
imaginatively 50 They become a presupposed backdrop that sets the
scene for our mutual interaction. Thus, for example, the work-
organization complex generates an assumption that the appropriate
mode of labour relations is one that accepts a rigid dichotomy
between "task-definition" and "task-execution." In this view, directors
control and determine the fortune of a commercial enterprise, while
the employees merely fulfill their appointed tasks. This is widely
Ibid. at 69-79. Note, however, that Unger is careful to point out that this list is not
exclusive and that, in particular, it does not include any of the imaginative components of a
formative context. Ibid. at 68-69. Later he posits that:
The core idea is that a formative context includes, together with major institutional
settlements, a moral geography of social life: a conception of how people can and
should deal with one another in the different fields of social practice. Sometimes, this
scheme of social life consists in a single, overpowering model of sociability, meant to
be repeated as a theme and variations throughout social life. In other cultures, by
contrast, the authoritative scheme of human association assumes the form of distinct
models of sociability, each set in contrast to the others. Thus, the most influential
preconceptions about sociability prevailing in the contemporary North Atlantic
democracies assign radically different standards of human association to government,
family life, and economic activity.
Ibid. at 101-2.
50 For example:
In the contemporary Western democracies the social framework includes legal rules
that use property rights as the instrument of economic decentralization, constitutional
- arrangements that provide for representation while discouraging militancy, and a style
of business organization that starkly contrasts task-defining and task-executing activities.
In the industrial democracies the formative structure of social life also incorporates a
series of models of human association that are expected to be realized in different areas
of social existence: a model of private community applying to the life of family and
friendship, a model of democratic organization guiding the activities of governments and
political parties, and a model of private contract combined with impersonal technical
hierarchy addressing the prosaic realm of work and exchange.
Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 3.
The reader may at this point detect a possible contradiction. In the previous footnote,
I indicated that Unger seemed to say that he was not dealing with the imaginative elements
of a formative context. Now, however, he appears to be saying that institutions have
imaginative repercussions. I will return to this point below to suggest that this lack of fit
results from a structural dichotomy in his work that, unfortunately, reproduces the
public/private dichotomy, a flaw that costs his critical credentials severely.
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understood to be natural, the inevitable method of achieving
economic efficiency. Of course, there may be vibrant debates as to
the extent of directorial responsibility or workers' rights, but all of
this takes place within the usually unchallenged assumption that the
ultimate control of the enterprise rests with the owners. Or again,
in relation to the private-rights complex, we tend to model all our
conceptions of rights on the paradigm of property conceived of as
permanent, nearly absolute, exclusive, possessive entitlements to
divisible portions of the social capital that provide us with a zone of
discretion into which no other may intrude. Again, there may be
debates as to what to include within the concept of rights, but the
fundamental "possessivist" conception of rights remains unchallenged.
As these examples demonstrate, the elements of the formative
context constrain the trajectory and potential of social interaction.
Moreover, there are homologies and points of intersection between
the work-organization complex and the private-rights complex, in
that each has a constitutive impact on the other51
More important still, embedded in these two elements of the
formative context, one can find a "rigid order of division and
hierarchy 52 that entrenches inequality, domination, and dependence.
The task-definition/task-execution dichotomy legitimizes patron/client
relations that are based on "ties of gratitude and fear."53  The
private-rights complex enables property holders to reduce others to
conditions of dependency. Clearly, then, as currently constituted,
each of these complexes is antithetical to the "radical project" of
empowered democracy.
Yet, for Unger, neither of these twin dynamics should be
understood as total. Through a lengthy discussion of the genesis of
the work-organization complex, the private-rights complex, and the
governmental-organization complex, he presents an historical thesis
that demonstrates, not only the contingent and paradoxical origins
51He is at pains to emphasize, however, that the relationship is not one of determinism.
An example of such a viewpoint would be the economistic Marxist argument that the economic
base determines the legal superstructure. See K. Marx, "Preface to a Contribution to a
Critique of Political Economy" in D. McLellan, ed., Karl Marc Selected Writings (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1977) at 388.
52 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 135.
53 Ibid. at 137.
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of each of these complexes, but also the pervasiveness of resilient
and unassimilable deviations5 4 For Unger, instability is as pervasive
as stability, though it tends to be obscured by the "deceptive patina
of naturalness and necessity."' s He develops for our consideration
the following examples. In relation to the work-organization
complex, he posits that, as the twentieth century 6 has moved
forward, economic success has become increasingly dependent upon
the ability to innovate. In turn, this has required a flexibility that is
incompatible with a rigid distinction between task-execution and
task-definition.5 7  With the blurring of the distinction, patron/client
relations, though still pervasive, have become somewhat more fluid
and dispersed and therefore unstable. Similarly, within the private-
rights complex, there have been transgressions and deviations that
simply do not fit within the proprietary paradigm: for example, the
legal doctrines of unjust enrichment, inequality of bargaining power,
and fiduciary relations in contract law. Even more importantly still,
Unger argues that the current escalation of these instabilities and
deviations echoes the fact that there is emerging an alternative vision
of the nature and patterns of human association and the appropriate
conditions of social interaction, one that rejects clientalism,
domination, and dependence:
The basic, minimal theme has been negative and cautionary: the claim that the
dominant forms of industrial society to have emerged in the course of Western history
cannot be correctly understood as required by the inherent constraints of practical
organization or economic necessity. At successive points in the history of these
institutional arrangements, solutions containing the elements of alternative institutional
schemes were proposed or tried out. The deviations emerged repeatedly; each step
toward the consolidation of a dominant style of economic or governmental organization
created new opportunities to break away from it. There is no end in sight to the
rearrangements nor - if the general view of society developed in this study is correct
- can there be. One of the most important reasons for this continuous recurrence of
54 Ibid. at 180-220.
55 Ibid. at 262.
56 The historical deviance can be traced to petty commodity production which, as we
shall see, is the prototype for Unger's reconstructed economy.
57 In fact, Unger goes on to suggest that in these developments we can locate the
rudiments of a "rival ... style of economic organization," a more democratic "system of
decentralized and flexible production and dissociated property" that can provide an alternative
to the current hierarchal system of economic relations. Such a system draws its impetus from,
but goes far beyond, petty commodity production. False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 222.
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alternatives is that no set of institutional practices or conceptions of social life ever
wins a complete victory. More often than not, the deviations persist. They reach an
accommodation with the victorious organizational arrangements, which they both
complement and jeopardize, and assume a subsidiary or anomalous role within an order
constituted on other principles. At any moment these anomalies of organization or
belief may be treated as points of departure for fundamental reconstruction. Thus, the
imagination may find in current reality the materials it needs for even its most
subversive efforts.58
Unger's point, then, is that the elements of the formative context
are in fact transient, that they vary in the extent to which they
tolerate flexibility, and that their inherent tensions can be
exacerbated and escalated in order to further "crack them open to
politics." Moreover, given their mutually constitutive nature, a
modification of one element may help generate modifications of
another.
The reason why his discussion of formative contexts is important
is that each of the components of the contexts comes about through
the peculiar and particular interaction of a variety of microforces.
Rather than being some inevitable conglomeration of social forces,
each formative context has "a hodgepodge, pasted-together, trumped-
up quality."59 It is the combination of these micro-peculiarities that
results in one formative context rather than another. More
importantly still, the script is not pre-written. It is human agency
that gives rise to the direction of each of these microforces and,
therefore, it is human agency that contributes to the overall nature
of a formative context. Viewed from this perspective, we can
remember that "[w]e put more of the infinite us into the finite
worlds in which we live."6° This is not to be taken as saying that a
particular society is the product of simple voluntarism or individual
intentionalism. Rather, it is simply to acknowledge that people play
a role in history, that their contribution to a micro-societal force may
have some impact - direct or indirect - on the larger context in
which they find themselves. The formative context is a combination
of a variety of humanly constructed social forces and, in that sense,
it is incompatible with necessitarian theories that rely on an
58 Ibid. at 221.
59 Ibid. at 96.
60 Ibid. at 97.
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essentialist dichotomy of framework and routine, with the in-built
conviction that the former determines the latter.61 This explanatory
theory of formative contexts is significant in that it is pivotal for
Unger's reconstructive and programmatic agenda. If a particular
formative context is a combination of microforces that are in part
the result of purposeful human agency, then, depending on the
direction of that agency, that combination could be different. An
awareness of combination allows for the possibility of recombination.
A formative context is not, therefore, an "indivisible package," for its
"components do not have to stand or fall together. They can be
replaced piecemeal. And each such partial substitution changes the
face of routine politics."62 Recombination can come about through
the reworking of the micro-societal forces so as to change the
context. Human agency plays a key role in these micro-societal
forces and this, in turn, has an impact upon the larger context.
Thus, to return to the example of liberalism with its assumption that
there is a necessary connection between private property and a free
market on the one hand, and freedom and equality on the other,
Unger argues that this is a confusing conflation that equates current
(and therefore contingent) market and democratic structures with the
essence of true democratic and market ordering. If we were to
change the nature and relations of both property and the market,
that would not necessarily eliminate freedom and equality. On the
contrary, we might just enhance freedom and equality by avoiding
the inequality and domination generated by current (monopolistic or
oligopolistic) market and political (elitist and privileged) structures/
processes. Unger's thesis is that the reason why formative contexts
change is not because of some inevitable, metahistorical law, but
because the subcomponents of the formative context are dynamic,
a dynamism that is generated by the purposeful activity of
61 One interesting example is his reinterpretation of the legal origins of corporate power
in the United States. Unger posits that, far from being either a necessary component in the
emergence of American democracy (a liberal conservative analysis) or an inevitable stage for
American capitalism (a Marxist analysis), the emergence of incorporationism was highly
contested and emerged as the result of a fusion of context-specific social microforces. Any
inevitability that it might appear to have is either the product of ea post facto rationalization
(in the case of liberals and conservatives) or weak economic history (in the case of Marxists).
Ibid. at 176-80.
62 Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 63.
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destabilizing human agency. Moreover, as we have seen, Unger's
preference is for those contexts that render themselves open to self-
revision, because those are the ones that offer the greatest scope for
human empowerment. Thus, the agenda of disentrenchment/
denaturalization is twofold: "the creation of formative contexts that
both undermine stable roles and hierarchies and efface the contrast
between context-preserving routine and context-transforming
conflict."63
It is in this way that Unger challenges the fatalism inherent in
the Twilightenment, by reclaiming the power of human agency, by
engendering empowerment, and by reactivating a smothered politics.
Society and social interaction are artifactual, constructed; what has
been constructed can be deconstructed and reconstructed. Contexts,
good or bad, are contingent; they can be smashed and remade. And
even more importantly, this can come about through ways other than
total revolution. Through the reworking of the subcomponents of
the formative contexts - by taking advantage of the deviations, the
resistances, the exceptions, and our human potential for negative
capability - the formative contexts themselves change, thereby
providing us with a middle path between fruitless reform and
inconceivable revolution. The Ungerian alternative is "revolutionary
reform"64 in the organization of government, law, the economy, and
our personal relations. In this way, he hopes to regenerate a
political practice that pursues the radical "commitment to weaken
rigid divisions among roles, genders, classes, communities, and whole
societies and to free us from the compulsions of unrevisable
contexts."6
5
2. Programmatic: institutional reconstruction
The programmatic argument that grows out of the foregoing
explanatory theory is underpinned and inspired by a vision of
desirable conditions and relations of social interaction. Unger's
63 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 253.
64 See, e.g., Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 163.
65 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 253.
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reconstructive proposals for government, the market, and law are
carefully designed to advance his conception of human
empowerment: the "disengage[ment] of our practical and passionate
dealings from the restrictive influence of entrenched social roles and
hierarchies."66 More particularly, "[t]he forms of governmental and
economic organization proposed ... emphasize the development of
practices and institutions that prevent factions, classes, or any other
specially placed groups from gaining control over the key resources
of a society (wealth, power, and knowledge). 67  In Politics, Unger
takes to heart the omnipresent liberal critique that traditionally the
left has been prolific with critique, but barren when it comes to
alternative suggestions. He takes as his responsibility the task of
articulating a relatively detailed programme of institutional
reconstruction that can facilitate the pursuit of human empowerment
through the disentrenchment of privilege. In this way, he hopes to
illustrate that his is, indeed, a credible theory of social
transformation.
a) Empowered democracy
Before we go any further, let us remind ourselves what Unger
is up to. As he is at pains to emphasize:
The program of empowered democracy is merely the next step in a trajectory: not
the millennium but the further emancipation of our practical and passionate
attachments from a predetermined script, the further subversion of a fixed plan of
social division and hierarchy, and the further reach toward the forms of individual and
collective empowerment this context smashing may produce.68
In this way, he hopes that we will be "freer to deal with one another
as individuals rather than as placeholders in the system of class,
communal, role, or gender contrasts."69 Moreover, he proposes that
the way to achieve this is to narrow the gap between framework-
66 Ibid. at 9.
6 7 Ibid. at 10.
68 Ibid. at 361.
69 Ibid. at 363.
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preserving routine and framework-transforming conflict, a move that
can be best achieved by the intensification of grass-roots
participation in the processes and structures of both state and
society. Thus, his ideal of "empowered democracy" encompasses
three different levels or varieties of empowerment: the achievement
of conscious control over the present formative context, the
reconciliation of individual autonomy with the need to establish
community, and the fostering of the productive capacities of society.
Moreover, the accomplishment of each is intertwined with the
accomplishment of the others, "the ends [are] prefigured in their
means"70 and cumulatively they enlarge our vision of the democratic
ideal. Further, Unger develops in fairly significant detail how we
should begin to remake contemporary western liberal democratic
institutions in pursuit of the ideal.
Unger spends a few hundred pages sketching out his proposals
for a renovation and recombination of the basic institutional
structure of society. His pivotal criticism of the majority of
contemporary institutions is that they are primarily preservative.
They are designed to reinforce existing cultural patterns, rather than
to change them. Such structural conservativism works to the
advantage of the already existent citadels of private power, thereby
helping to entrench inequality and illegitimate hierarchy. The
remedy suggested by Unger is neither anarchy nor revolution, but
reconstruction so that our institutions are more open, "structure-
revising" rather than "structure-preserving." Such a perspective
reverses the received hierarchy of stability and flexibility without
falling into chaos. The strategy is revolutionary reform: "the view
that formative contexts can be replaced piecemeal and the thesis
that the deviant elements in any social order have a subversive and
reconstructive potential."71
In keeping with his thesis of the artifactual nature of social
interaction and his proposition "that it's all politics" (and probably as
a rebuttal of the Marxist propensity for economic reductionism and
the lawyer's predilection for juridical self-aggrandizement), Unger
commences his discussion of institutional reconstruction by
70 Ibid. at 442.
71 Ibid at 468.
1990]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
emphasizing "the importance of the organization of government and
of the struggle over governmental power as the chief means for the
stabilization or destabilization of society."72  Thus, though still of
vital importance, both economics and law are decentered in that
"[l]awmaking and discretionary economic policy are the chief tools
with which the state goes to work on social life."73
b) Constitutional reorganization - political
Unger is very conscious of the crucial strategic power of the
state: "[for] the control of governmental power exercises an
overwhelming influence upon the course of conflict over the basic
form of society."74  In particular, he spends a great deal of time
talking about both the institutions and the political processes of
empowered democracy. In this section, there is only space to discuss
the former.75
Lest there be any confusion, Unger is no anarchist, for he
comes not to "bypass the state" but to "rebuild it."76 Indeed, he goes
out of his way to repudiate
as misguided and self-defeating, any attempt to do without large-scale governmental and
economic institutions and to replace institutional arrangements with an uncontroversial
system of pure, uncoercive human coordination. A premise of the program is that no
such system exists and that the development of less coercive systems of coordination
is bound . with the transformation - not the abolition - of governmental
institutions."
72 Ibid. at 442.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid at 401.
75 For tentative, but highly suggestive, discussions of the processes, practices, and
strategies of revolutionary reform and empowered democracy: see ibid. at 395-441, 539-50.
7 6 Ibid at 312.
77 Ibid at 432. But this is not to say that Unger sees no distinction between state and
civil society. For example, as we shall see later, he advocates a system of rights that limits
public, as well as private, power and he discusses what he calls "antigovernmental" or
"antistatist" voluntary associations that help "keep the state humble and the people proud,
inquisitive, and restless." Ibid. at 480. It is interesting to note, however, that this discussion
of voluntary associations makes reference to Tamara Lothian, one of the few references to a
woman in his rather useful notes. Ibid. at 627.
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For Unger, the great virtue of the state is that it ensures
remembrance of the artifactual nature of society, because "the
naturalization of society is the peculiar risk of statelessness."78
Through an intriguing discussion of the contingent origins and
historical mutations of the contemporary liberal constitutional
structure, a thesis that is designed to demonstrate that democracy
has no necessary inevitable form, Unger argues that traditionally our
political structures have been bifurcated so as to differentiate
between "fundamental" and "normal" politics. (Remember the
framework-routine dichotomy.) This distinction is institutionalized
through the differentiation of constitutional politics and everyday
politics, with the former providing the parameters for the latter.
The two realms differ in their openness to challenge and change.
Because it is understood to be more important, the constitutional
structure is rendered more inflexible, requiring exceptional
procedures for transformation, thereby "placing much of the
established institutional order effectively beyond the reach of
democratic politics."79  Viewed in this light, the classical liberal
constitutional technique of the separation of powers between the
executive, legislature, and the judiciary is primarily preservative of
the status quo because, like the forms of action, it channels the
pursuit of remedies through rigid, discrete, and constraining
processes. This encourages a process of institutional fobbing off,
thereby reinforcing the already entrenched politics of privilege,
facilitating a hardening of the "links between private privilege and
governmental power,"80 and allowing the state to become hostage to
an entrenched faction. Moreover, the conservative bent of the
constitutional political set up has a trickle down effect in that it
overdetermines the potential range of possibilities available in the
realm of normal politics. Resistance to change is therefore
structurally ensured through "constitutional rules that discourage bold
programmatic experiments."81
78 Ibid at 505.
79 Ibid at 449.
80 Ibid at 406.
81 Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 85.
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Unger argues, however, that there is no need to acquiesce in
such "demobilizing constitutionalism, 82 that there is no a priori
reason why our political structures must be constructed in this way.
Rather, he argues that such a perspective incorporates a background
assumption that prefers stability over change. If we preferred
openness to fixity, radical democracy to the entrenchment of elitism,
then, because of the importance of the constitution, we would
construct it so as to incorporate a "principle of permanent self-
revision"83 to facilitate change and inspire a volatile normal politics,
rather than the opposite. The important question then becomes:
In whose interests do these competing assumptions about stability
and malleability operate? Unger realizes that, at this point, it is not
possible to turn the constitutional structure inside out in a way that
would be attractive to him - as a "constitutionalism of permanent
mobilization"84 - so he suggests that we attempt to liquify the
distinction between constitutional and ordinary politics so as to make
the former more like the latter.
Particularly, he suggests that we "must therefore multiply the
number of branches in governments while attributing overlapping
functions to the agencies of the state."85 For example, he suggests
the establishment of a new branch of government - the
destabilization branch86 - that is charged with
enlarging access to the means of communication, information, and expertise, all the
way from the heights of governmental power to the internal arrangements of the
workplace....
8 7
Such a branch of government must be legally and financially qualified to oversee the
basic arrangements separating technical coordination and managerial advice from a
generic disciplinary authority in the workplace.... It must be able to make know-how
available to those who, under the conditions I shall describe, set up new productive
enterprises. It must be able to intervene in all other social institutions and change
82 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 459.
83 bid at 461.
8 4  id. at 462.
85 Ibid at 449.
86 This is my term not Unger's, although obviously it dovetails with the spirit of his
proposal.
87 Ibid at 450.
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their operations, by veto or affirmative initiative. Its power to intervene must be
directly related to the task of securing the conditions that would maximize information
about affairs of state and achieve the maximum subordination of expert cadres to
collective conflicts and deliberations. The officers of such a branch would be selected
by joint suffrage of other powers in the state, the parties of opinion, and the universal
electorate8 8
The purpose of such a branch would be to "rescu[eI know-how from
privilege,"8 9 to inhibit the overconcentration of knowledge - for that
results in domination - and to facilitate its redistribution because, in
Unger's opinion, that will enhance competition, equality, and
efficiency.
The immediate problem with such a proposal is that such an
interventionist branch could become despotic, a sort of
superexecutive, unrestrained by the other institutions or processes of
government. Such a criticism leads to the second plank of Unger's
proposal for constitutional renovation: the attribution of overlapping
functions to different governmental agencies. This suggestion is an
attempt to forge democratic accountability through a technique that
does not succumb to the sclerotic - and structurally conservative -
effects of the system of checks and balances. 90 The basic idea is to
decentralize power in order to enable various institutions to perform
a variety of responsibilities that are, within the current liberal
democratic scheme of things, functionally discrete. Thus, the
judiciary, legislature, and executive (and his other suggested novel
institutions of government) would begin to fulfill, in part, each
others' functions.91 The central advantage is that this would enable
88 lbid. at 450-51.
89 1bid at 453.
90 Again, the technique adopted by Unger is to demonstrate the contingent historical
sources of the system of checks and balances and to posit its now anachronistic nature.
91 This may not be as heretical as one might think. Consider, for example, the various
functions fulfilled by the Canadian Human Rights Commission: advocate, investigator,
adjudicator, conciliator, bureaucracy, lawmaker, monitor, and educator/lobbyist. Consider two
further examples: in R. v. Operation Dismantle, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 455, the Supreme
Court of Canada interpreted the Charter so as to give an expansive understanding of judicial
jurisdiction, one that allows them to intervene even on political questions, the traditional
preserve of the executive:
Cabinet decisions fall under s. 32(1)(a) of the Charter and are therefore reviewable in
the courts and subject to judicial scrutiny for compatibility with the Constitution. I
have no doubt that the executive branch of the Canadian Government is duty bound
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and encourage the citizenry to participate in all the institutions of
government, to mobilize, make claims, and repudiate the bureaucratic
denials of institutional appropriateness. Moreover, given that the
original rationale for the system of checks and balances was for the
protection of citizens from an overly intrusive state, this legitimate
concern can be achieved in an alternative way: through his
reconstructed system of rights.92
To summarize, through a renovation of the institutions of
government and by the means of a diversification of functions,
Unger hopes to jumble up the currently quasi-paralytic nature of
governmental activity to encourage extended civic participation and
to counteract the politics of private privilege. Those ambitions
however - if serious - also require an assault on the citadels of
economic power.
c) Empowered democracy and the reorganization of the economy
True to his anti-necessitarian faith, Unger argues that the
concept of the market is institutionally indeterminate. That is, he
argues that the generic idea of a market has no necessary particular
institutional manifestation, that several different variations of
exchange relations can all qualify as a market.93 In making this
claim, Unger seeks to make explicit and direct the connection
between the constitution and the market to illuminate the nexus
between politics and economics. Like the state and law, the
economy is artifactual.
Unger argues that within liberal democratic society there has
been a conflation of the abstract concept of the market with an
to act in accordance with the dictates of the Charter.
At the same time, section 33 of the Charter allows for parliamentary or legislative override of
certain constitutional rights, infringing what, in traditional American conceptions of the
separation of powers, is the preserve of the judicial branch.
92 See section IlI.B.2.(d), infra at 675ff.
93 For example, laissezfaire, corporatist, cooperative, and regulatory/distributive exchange
relations can all be considered markets, but each envisions very different conceptions of the
market. None more accurately captures the essence of a market because the concept of
market is, to use Gallie's phrase, "essentially contested."
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historically specific set of juridico-economic assumptions and
institutions, what he calls the "consolidated property right." Through
this concept, Unger attempts to get an angle on the widely held
belief that property has one essential meaning: that the owner has
an exclusive, "more or less absolute entitlement to a divisible portion
of social capital - more or less absolute both in its discretionary use
and in the chain of voluntary transfers by successive property
owners."
94
Although Unger recognizes that the virtue of the consolidated
property right is that it allows for decentralization and therefore the
possibility of autonomy, he polemicizes vehemently against its
weaknesses from the perspective of empowered democracy. When
considered through the desideratum of freedom, the consolidated
property right is doubly flawed. First, it allows for an unrestrained
concentration of wealth, thereby enabling a small number of people
to have disproportionate control over the direction of the economy.
In a word, it is anti-democratic. Second, it is disempowering in that
its acceptance of the task-definition/task-execution dichotomy
tolerates and legitimizes "inequalities of wealth that reduce some
people to effective economic dependence upon others."95  Nor,
according to Unger, can these twin concerns be set off against
traditional economic criteria such as progress. The consolidated
property right is, within the scheme of Ungerian economics,
insufficiently efficient, inadequately decentralizing, undersupportive
of plasticity and innovation, and overly constraining upon "growth-
oriented macro-economic policy."96 Thus, though it might be deeply
entrenched in our collective psyche, the consolidated property right
uniquely combines privilege, domination, and waste.
Unger denies the hegemony of this conception of property,
positing that other variations on the idea of a property right are
conceivable, workable, and desirable if we really do aspire to a more
egalitarian society. Unger's favoured alternative is a "disaggregated
property right": one that allows for conditional and limited
94 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 481.
95 Ibid at 483.
96 See section II.B.2.(d), infra at 675ff.
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individual and group claims to portions of the social capital. 97
Traces of this proposal are already to be found in the ways in which
governments currently interface with industry.98 This idea is worked
out in greater detail through a discussion of what he calls the
"1rotating capital fund" which is designed to fragment
control over capital into several tiers of capital takers and capital givers. The ultimate
capital giver is a social capital fund controlled by the decisional center of the
empowered democracy: the party in office and the supporting representative
assemblies. The ultimate capital takers are teams of workers, technicians, and
entrepreneurs, who make temporary and conditional claims upon divisible portions of
this social capital fund. The central fund does not lend money out directly to the
primary capital users. Instead, it allocates resources to a variety of semi-independent
investment funds. Each investment fund specializes in a sector of the economy and in
a type of investment. The central democratic institutions exercise their ultimate control
over the forms and rates of economic accumulation and income distribution by
establishing these funds or by closing them out, by assigning them new infusions of
capital or by taking capital away from them, by charging them interest (whose payment
represents the major source of governmental finance), and, most importantly, by setting
the outer limits of variation in the terms on which the competing investment funds may
allocate capital to the ultimate capital takers. The investment funds may take resources
away from one another, thus forming in effect a competitive capital market, whose
operations are also overseen by the central representative bodies of the democracy.
The investment funds in turn allocate resources to the primary capital takers - teams
of entrepreneurs, technicians, and workers - under two different regimes. The funds
set the terms on which financial and technological resources may be obtained. The
capital users pay an interest charge to their investment fund just as the latter pays a
charge to the central social fund. Within the limits laid down by both the central
governmental bodies and the competing investment funds, these direct capital takers
buy and sell. Within those limits they, too, may bid resources away from one another.
They profit from successful enterprise and suffer from business failure. But they never
acquire permanent individual or group rights to the capital they receive. Nor does
success entitle them to expand continuously, to buy out other enterprises, or to
Unger would also abolish the hereditary transmission of substantial assets, as he
considers inheritance anti-egalitarian and antithetical to dissociation.
98 Consider, for example, the plethora of contributions, subsidies, grants, low interest
and forgivable loans, loan guarantees, and tax incentives that governments provide to market
players. Consider also Esquimalt and Nanaimo Ry Co. v.A.G. British Columbia, [1948] S.C.R.
403, [1950] A.C. 87 (Privy Council); R. v. Lethbridge Colleries, [1951] S.C.R. 138; R. v. Joy Oil
Co., [1949] Ex. C.R. 136, aff'd [1951] S.C.R. 624. These cases, which are usually categorized
as lack of governmental contractual intent, may be better understood as progenitors of a
disaggregrated property right, one that recognizes an entitlement, but one that is temporary,
not permanent. Thus, rather than having the absolutist dichotomy of contract/no contract, we
can recognize a more context specific understanding of relations of interdependence. See also,
Grant v. New Brunswick (1973), 6 N.B.R. (2d) 95 (N.B. C.A.).
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introduce into their own business a special category of relatively disadvantaged and
voiceless workers. Success merely increases their income.
9 9
Underlying the idea of the rotating capital fund, then, there are two
seemingly paradoxical ambitions: a more socially responsible
economy that is open to democratic review and control and, at the
same time, a more flexible and innovative economy because of its
structurally ensured decentralization.
This triple layered structuring of the market to decentralize the
relations between capital-givers and capital-takers, while at the same
time encouraging democratic control and entrepreneurial innovation,
can be schematized on the chart on the following page.' 00 The idea
behind such a capital-allocation system is to help increase the
flexibility and productivity of the market, to convert the economy
into a "perpetual innovation machine,"101 while at the same time
decentralizing and fragmenting economic power with its ever present
potential for exploitation and domination. This Unger calls a
modernized and "reconstructed version of petty commodity
production."10
2
A reconstruction of the economy on the basis of the
disaggregation of the consolidated property right and the rotating
capital fund provides a unique opportunity for greater openness and
99 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 491-92.
100 Of course, there are concerns about the extent of state power if it has access to such
direct control of the economy. Unger spends a great deal of time outlining new forms of
participation and accountability that are designed to counterbalance such power. Economics
and politics are carefully woven together in the Ungerian scheme, whereas modem liberalism
attempts to deal with their relationship through denying its existence.
101 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 491.
102 Tbid at 31. Unger proudly admits the motivation for this idea is to be traced back
to what he describes as the "tradition of petty bourgeois radicalism" which envisions "the co-
existence of a large number of relatively equal small-scale producers or productive enterprises
as the mainstay of economic organization" Ibid. at 28-29. The differences, however, are that
the petty bourgeois radicals believed in a consolidated property right, whereas Unger believes
in its disaggregation and that the rotating capital fund does allow for large economic units,
though controlled.
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opportunity'03 that does not call for anarchy, or even inefficiency,
but the decentering of the economics of privilege. However, a
democratized economy and an egalitarian mode of exchange
relations can only be achieved if there is also ongoing reworking of
the constitutional structure and a remaking of the system of rights.
d) Rights
Greater specificity can be given to these ideas of constitutional
reconstruction and economic reorganization through an overview of
Unger's system of rights. Unlike many critics of liberalism, Unger
does not advocate the abandonment of rights discourse. Rather, he
advocates a redefinition and expansion of rights to facilitate
individual and group empowerment and to enhance security and
participation, while decentering the privileges of property.
Note, however, that Unger's approach to rights is a far cry
from the abstract deontologicalism of much of contemporary
liberalism. Rather, Unger's conception of rights is much more
context specific. It is a carefully tailored schematization that is
designed to facilitate the demands of empowered democracy.
Perhaps the best way to understand his theory of rights is to
recognize the homology with his critique and reformation of the
economy. Remember that, for Unger, the core problem with the
current economy is the constraining influence of the consolidated
property right. The consolidated property right is not simply an
economic presupposition, although it is that too and therefore vitally
important. It is also a foundational legal principle. Indeed, it is
because of its centrality to the legal regime that it is so important
to the market. Restated, the consolidated property right is
constitutive of both contemporary law and the modern economy.
Therefore, it has to go.
103 This opportunity ripples beyond the extended availability of capital towards the
transformation of the conditions of labour. To a significant extent, Unger expects
disaggregation and decentralization to generate a softening of the distinction between task-
definition and task-execution that encourages the corralling of all entrepreneurial resources,
regardless of the traditional hierarchies of employer and employee.
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The problem with the consolidated property right from the
legal point of view is that it has attained imaginative and practical
hegemony both in form and substance. Earlier, we identified its
substantive components - property as exclusive, permanent, nearly
absolute control - and its democratic and economic weaknesses.
Much of modern law is simply a concretization and routinization of
the consolidated property right and its limitations. But the
consolidated property right works its nefarious influence on law in
a second, perhaps more important, way: through its form. Because
of its position of ideological dominance, it has become "a model for
rights dealing with matters far removed from the methods for
economic decentralization."' °4 The consolidated property right has
become the prototype for conceptualizing rights. All thinking about
rights is moulded to "force large areas of existing social practice into
incongruous legal forms."105 Unger's thesis is that by mimicking this
possessive proprietary paradigm, we have suffered a drastic myopia
in developing our imaginative legal structures.
In order to smash through the substantive and formal hegemony
of the consolidated property right, the Ungerian constitution would
provide for four categories of rights, thereby disaggregating property,
enlarging democracy, and capturing more subtly the complex and
diverse modes of social interaction.
i) Market
Market rights are designed to facilitate economic exchange and
would have two facets. First, they would provide capital-takers with
"conditional and provisional" entitlements to the economically crucial
rotating capital fund. Second, they would regulate the relations of
exchange between economic enterprises to ensure entrepreneurial
initiative. In a sense, this would be similar to the function fulfilled
by contemporary property and contract law, absent, of course, the
influence of the consolidated property right. As a result, the
Ungerian manifesto does not call for the abolition of property or
104 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 512.
105 ibid
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contract, but merely their transmutation. Property, as we already
know, would be disaggregated, while contract would pursue with
greater alacrity its current subtext of relative fairness.
This last point should be elaborated upon. Frequently, lawyers
assume that exchange relations are driven by an adversarial, mutually
exploitative dynamic. However, as over two decades of socio-legal
research have indicated, there is extensive collaboration and
interdependence between business enterprises. 10 6  Economic
efficiency recognizes the value of relationalism, co-operation, and
give and take. Unger simply wants law and the legal framework to
do the same. (I will return to this point in the discussion of
deviationist legal doctrine.) 07
ii) Immunity
Immunity rights are designed to ensure security of the individual
while enabling the citizen to participate actively and equally in the
polity, free from the oppression of both public and private power.
Not only would they incorporate traditional liberal democratic rights
- freedom of expression and association, freedom from arbitrary
arrest - they would also ensure welfare rights10 8 to free the citizen
106 S. Macauley, "Non Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study" (1963)
28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55; and "Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures and the Complexities of
Contract" (1977) 11 Law & Soc. Rev. 537; H. Beale and T. Dugdale, "Contracts Between
Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies" (1975) 2 Brit. J.L. & Soc. 45.
107 See section III.B.2.(e), infra at 681ff. There is an important point to be made here.
Although Unger develops four categories of rights, these should not be understood as mutually
exclusive. As will become clear, aspects of market rights are closely connected with solidarity
rights, while welfare rights, though classified as a part of his immunity rights, are essential
for the adoption of destabilization rights. In this sense, the Ungerian system of rights is
interstructured.
108 They are defined as "guarantees of access to the material and cultural resources
needed to make a life. These include provision for nourishment, housing, health care, and
education, with absolute standards proportional to the wealth of society." False Necessity,
supra, note 3 at 528. Welfare rights are a cognate of equality of condition in that they aspire
to a "major equalization in the material circumstances of life." Ibial at 47 and see also ibid.
at 588. But there are limits on how far Unger wants to go. In his reconstructed economy,
capital-takers will still gain or lose financially depending on the success or failure of their
market activities. The rationale for differentiation appears in his belief that profit is a
significant, though not necessarily essential, factor for worker motivation. The safeguard is
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from economic oppression that not infrequently makes effective
participation impossible.!09 Thus, immunity rights are not to be
understood as merely negative freedoms - state keep out - rather
they are positive freedoms designed to mobilize the populace to
participate, secure in the knowledge that any retribution (public or
private) for democratic involvement'1 cannot result in subjugation.
Immunity is a cognate of participation. Moreover, according to
Unger, although immunity rights incorporate traditional liberal
democratic rights, these will take on a new empowered meaning
given that the broader context - economic and political - in which
they operate is in the throes of revolutionary reform.
iii) Destabilization
Destabilization rights are designed to ensure continued openness
and to guard against closure with its correlative dangers of the
entrenchment of privilege and the institutionalization of oppression.
Destabilization rights enable the citizen to criticize and disturb all
institutions and practices, public and private, and contemplate
institutional support for such transgressive activity. Thus, for
example, if an economic enterprise was able to generate enough
economic and political power to achieve "agency capture" of the
intermediate investment funds and thereby to rework to its
advantage market relations, those who would be reduced to
dependence by such developments could call on other branches of
that failure will not result in impoverishment.
Note also that welfare rights do not include job tenure, as that would impose too
great a limitation upon the requirement of economic flexibility. However, he suggests that the
reason why workers want job tenure is because at the present time we have an underdeveloped
system of welfare rights, a concern that will no longer apply in an Ungerian society.
109 A prime example is women. See, e.g., B. Nelson, "Women's Poverty and Women's
Citizenship: Some Political Consequences of Economic Marginality" (1984) 10 Signs 209
[hereinafter Women's Poverty]. The claim is not that women are apolitical, rather it is that
they do not participate as actively in malestream politics, in part, because of their economic
subordination. They do, however, participate in many other forms of politics.
110 Should anyone be so naive as to believe that the power elite of Canadian society,
for example, would never be so crass as to use their economic power to coerce the workforce
into political line, consider the disciplinary role adopted by employers during the free trade
election, 1988. See N. Fillmore, "The Big Oink" (1989) 22:8 77s Magazine 13.
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government, including, but not limited to, the destabilization branch,
to disrupt and derange such developments. And this would be a
constitutional right.
Though curious, destabilization rights already have inchoate
precedents in contemporary law, for "the opportunity to destabilize
and to reconstruct is always built into the very devices that
perpetuate the existing social peace." '111 Consider, for example, the
injunctive relief granted by the judiciary in relation to the practices
of hospitals, asylums, and schools, institutions which traditionally
have tended to be exempt from the desiderata of equality or
democracy. Or again, consider judicial intervention in the electoral
process in an attempt to secure greater equality.1 12 Even more
poignant are the activities of the Canadian Human Rights
Commission and decisions of the courts promoting the remedies of
employment equity.113 But note also that the judiciary are not
identified as the necessary guardians of destabilization. Given
Unger's earlier proposal for overlapping functions and his advocacy
in favour of a new destabilization branch, we cannot take refuge in
the old shibboleths or trust an ancient and privileged bureaucracy.
iv) Solidarity
Finally, solidarity rights recognize our vulnerability as social
beings and attempt to "give legal form to social relations of reliance
and trust."114  In particular, they are a response to the more
communal elements of our activities:
The domain of solidarity rights is the field of the half-articulate relations of trusting
interdependence that absorb so much of ordinary social life but remain troublesome
abberations for a legal theory devoted to the model of consolidated property. The
situations calling for the exercise of such entitlements include family life, continuing
business relationships (as distinguished from one-shot transactions), and the varied
range of circumstances falling under fiduciary principles in contemporary law. The
ill False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 546.
112 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Dixon v. A.G. British Columbia (1989), 35
B.C.LR. (2d) 273.
113 Action Travail des Femmes v. C.N.R, [1987] 1 8.C.R. 1114.
114 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 535.
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trust such relations require may be voluntary and reciprocal or half-deliberate and
unequal, usually in the setting of disparities of power or advantage.
11 5
Unger is cautious not to be misunderstood in his espousal of
solidarity rights. Although they are anti-individualistic in that they
impose an obligation to "take other people's situations and
expectations into account, 116 they are not designed to enforce a
"despotism of virtue" where everybody is a "goody goody." That
would be too substantive for Unger. Rather:
[t]he immediate aim, instead, is to accomplish just the reverse of what consolidated
property offers the rightholder. People bound by solidarity rights are prevented from
taking refuge in an area of absolute discretion within which they can remain deaf to
the claims others make upon them. Thus, solidarity rights deny the discretionary action
both immunity rights and market rights seek to protect.
11 7
Finally, solidarity rights differ from the traditional conception of
rights in that, rather than being abstract, they emerge from context
specific situations of reliance and interdependence.
This is a particularly interesting proposal in that traditionally
working on an assumed public/private dichotomy, most legal thought
considers law to be too blunt an instrument for the regulation of
intimate and communal relations. Not so for Unger. He recognizes
that "it's all politics," and where there is politics there is power, and
where there is power there is a possibility of domination and
subordination. For example, at one point he describes the family as
"a structure of power, ennobled by sentiment,"118 and suggests that
legal abstentionism from the family realm can result in complicity in
domination. He refuses to accept such an idyllic conception of
community or acquiesce in such a restrictive understanding of rights.
Yet, at the same time, he wants to expand our conception of rights
so that we are not simply publicizing the private realm. Even
though solidarity rights are rights, they need not attain their quality
of being a right on the premise of positivism, that is, that they are
coercively enforced by the state. That particular presupposition is
11 5 1bid at 536-37.
116 Ibid at 537.
117 jbid
118 Critical Legal Studies, supra, note 6 at 65-66.
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one that is tied to a conception of rights that is formally
underpinned by the consolidated property right. Rights for Unger
are a "public declaration of a public vision ... of possible and
desirable human association. '119 Consequently, solidarity rights may
be coercively enforced, but many "may best be enforced ... by more
informal means of mediation, with more ample participation from
parties, families, communities or work teams."1 20 But they are rights
nonetheless.
e) Deviationist legal doctrine1 21
Unger also opens up everyday legal practice and discourse to
reconstruction. He claims that the formalist aspiration to distinguish
law from politics is fallacious and that legal disputes always invoke
competing background assumptions about alternative schemes of
human co-existence. Thus, for example, he interprets contract
doctrine to be structured around principles and counterprinciples
which co-exist in tension. The ascendent principles relate to the
classical model of freedom of and freedom to contract, a perspective
that is premised on a more individualistic conception of social
relations. He argues that the principles have never attained
complete hegemony and have been modified by counterprinciples
that emphasize interdependence and reliance, a perspective that is
premised on a more communitarian conception of social interaction.
He posits that neither can attain such extensive pre-eminence so as
to exclude completely the influence of the other, but that different
balances reflect broader political understandings of the good society.
Thus, he argues that it is the responsibility of progressive lawyers to
practice what he calls "deviationist doctrine": to expand from within,
to use the tools and doctrine already available to make the law
reflect a more interdependent vision of social interaction. For
119 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 539.
120 Ibid at 538-39.
121 The previous paragraph and this section draw on Critical Legal Studies, supra, note
6, rather than Politics, but, for the sake of comprehensiveness, it is useful to include his
proposals.
1990]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
example, he would see the growth of estoppel and the recent
recommendations of the Ontario Law Reform Commission to expand
the scope of unconscionability, good faith, and fairness in contractual
relations122 as steps in the right direction, although requiring much
greater effort and commitment.
f) Plasticity and Passion
If we step back from these more detailed proposals for politics,
economics, and law, we can see that the "key strategy" of
empowered democracy "is to combine freedom of enterprise and
governance at the local level with the opportunity for political
parties in central government to promote decisive social experiments,
particularly experiments that change institutions as well as
policies. '123  Restated, empowered democracy is about the
maximization of plasticity 24 and a belief that "law and the
constitution [should be] the denial rather than the reaffirmation of
the plan of social division and hierarchy."1 25
Clearly, then, the Ungerian political agenda is ambitious in that
it expects re-visioning of the world, a reconceptualization of politics,
and a remaking of the basic structure of society. This is a lot to
expect from a community that has become mired in the modernist
malaise, succumbed to the "consumerist rapture of a privatistic
hedonism. ' 126 Yet true to form and driven by his conviction that
"it's all politics," Unger refuses to believe that this is our destiny.
Thus, in the penultimate section of False Necessity, he posits a
"cultural-revolutionary counterpart to the institutional program," by
which he means an Ungerian theory of human nature. The claim is
relatively straightforward: there are homologies between our
122 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Amendment of the Law of Contract
(Toronto: The Commission, 1987).
123 Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 87.
124 I will return to the theme of plasticity in the overview of the final volume of Politics.
125 R.M. Unger, "fhe Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1983) Harv. L. Rev. 561 at 585.
126 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 545.
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"practical" and "passionate" lives and for either to be viable they
must be mutually complementary. Thus, paralleling his modernist
theory of society - the theory that identifies its contextual and
artifactual nature - there is a modernist theory of human nature:
one that argues that we have no fixed, immutable characteristics,
that we are "the infinite caught within the finite." The connection
is crucial, for "the qualities of our direct practical or passionate
dealings always represent the ultimate object of our conflicts over
the organization of society., 127
Most of the ideas for this "personalized program" were
developed in a previous work PassionJs The basic idea is a revised
"ideal of community," but one that does not indulge in the fantasy
of unmitigated harmony:
The kernel of this revised ideal of community is the notion of a zone of heightened
mutual vulnerability, within which people gain a chance to resolve more fully the
conflict between the enabling conditions of self-assertion: between their need for
attachment and for participation in group life and their fear of the subjugation and
depersonalization with which such engagement may threaten them.... This notion of
community shifts the gravitational center of the communal ideal away from the sharing
of values and opinions and the exclusion of conflict. Here is a version of community
that, although jeopardized by conflict, also thrives on it.1 2
9
In a sense, this conception of community allows Unger to come full
circle. Through conflict as vulnerability, we, as empowered
citizens,130 can begin to defy, transvalue, and jumble up socially
ascribed roles - class and gender are two that he mentions.1 31 They
are roles that tend to swallow the person; roles that play a crucial
function in perpetuating and reinforcing the realities of social
127 Ibid at 556.
128 Although he also promises us a successor volume that "will explore the implications
of the anti-necessitarian thesis for an understanding of the microstructure of social life: the
realm of direct practical and passionate relations" Ibid. at 560.
129 Ibid. at 562.
130 Unger also wanders into the realm of psychology. At one point, almost mirroring
Adorno's characterization of the authoritarian personality, Unger identifies three tendencies
of the "empowered personality": the accentuation of desire in both scope and intensity; the
enlargement of the imagination; and the broadening of the opportunities so as to realize the
former two tendencies. Ibid at 579-80.
131 Ibid at 564.
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division and hierarchy; pre-ordained roles that, in large part, are
responsible for our disempowerment and dependency.
To reduce Unger's scheme to its most basic: anti-necessitarian
social theory, plus institutional reconstruction, plus cultural
revolution equals the possibility of empowerment.
C. Plasticity into Power: Comparative-Historical Studies on the
Institutional Conditions of Economic and Military Success
This final volume is an in-depth, historical inquiry designed to
demonstrate the explanatory superiority of the theory of formative
contexts over its positivistic and necessitarian rivals. Through an
erudite and thought-provoking discussion of a variety of historical
examples, Unger documents how those societies which have been
"successful" share a common heritage of institutional flexibility, that
is, the ability to adapt quickly' 32 to other rapidly mutating forces
within their formative context. The further suggestion is that,
insofar as they illustrate a social theory that "enlarges our sense of
the real and the possible,"13 3 they provide role models that we
should be loathe to ignore. Two substantive themes unite this
volume: the first is that "social plasticity brings wealth and power to
the societies and groups that achieve it,"134 and the second is that
"the subjection of factional privilege to challenge and conflict has
been the single most important spur to social plasticity."135  The
Ungerian message of success is twofold: "the gospel of plasticity"13 6
and mastery of the art of "institutional dissociation and
recombination."1 37 Each of the three essays in this relatively short
132 As he pithily posits, "Worldly success requires self-transformation." Plasticity, supra,
note 6 at 101.
133 Ibid. at 1.
134 Ibid at 1-2.
135 I'bid at 2.
136 Ibid
13 7 Ibid at 209.
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volume revolves around a theme: productivity, power, and plasticity,
which for convenience we might call the three P's."
The first essay is an intellectually impressive macro-historical
review of the cycles of commercial vibrancy and languor that
characterized pre-industrial societies. Its particular focus is to
unpack "the social conditions and the institutional inventions that
enabled some societies to escape these cycles and, as a result, to
revolutionize the world."138 Unger takes as his star examples late
medieval Europe and seventeenth and eighteenth century Japan and,
through an analysis of their differences, demonstrates the importance
of contextual political conflict to the achievement of economic
breakthrough.
The second essay is an historical analysis into the relationship
between wealth and military force. Specifically, it is an attempt to
identify the contingent political events that generate and the
innovative (indeed adventitious) social, political, fiscal, and
technological conditions which satisfy the successful military
protection and consolidation of wealth.
The third essay unites some of the themes of the first two. It
attempts to identify the enabling social and political conditions of
military success which, apparently within the Ungerian scheme of
things, are foundational for the well-being of a society. The key is
"the thesis of reconstructability": the societal talent for self-
transformation and the relentless re-orderings, "dissociations and
recombinations of institutional arrangements,"139 even - or more
accurately, especially - if that comes at the expense of the
subversion of the traditional social roles, hierarchies, and divisions. 140
As the man says, "Anything for success."141
138 Ibid at 3.
139 Ibid at 206.
140 Unger does point out that such a dynamic has not resulted in "egalitarianism or
democracy in the state and the economy," although his suggestion is that, in so far as it is
subversive, it is of precedential value. Ibid. at 187.
141 Ibid at 189.
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The common denominator, indeed, "the condition, ' 42 for both
productive (wealth) and destructive (military) success is plasticity,
that is,
the facility with which work relations among people - in a plant, in a bureau, in an
army - can be constantly shifted in order to suit changing circumstances, resources, and
intentions. Plasticity is the opportunity to innovate in the immediate organizational
settings of production, exchange, administration, or warfare and to do so not just by
occasional, lar e-scale reforms but by an ongoing, cumulative flow of small-scaleinnovations.143
Moreover, according to Unger, this discovery of the explanatory
centrality of plasticity and the historical vitality of "pitiless
recombination 144 has only become possible because of the insights
of an anti-necessitarian social theory. Furthermore, plasticity
dovetails with the determinative agenda of anti-necessitarianism: the
therapeutic knowledge that humankind does make its own history,
that we are not the puppets of a pre-ordained script.
Given the historical and comparative nature of Plasticity, one
might be tempted to pass over it in a review targeted for lawyers.
However, that would be a mistake, for, as will become evident, its
very specificity provides us with a critical angle through which to
unpack some of the weaknesses in the overall agenda.
What, then, are we to make of this Ungerian "super theory"?
Already it has spawned a progeny of responses, particularly from
representatives of those whom he critiques - liberals, conservatives,
Marxists, social democrats, and civic republicans.1 45 Some of this
commentary has been cautiously positive, while others have been
viciously hostile. In the following sections, I attempt to develop a
critical response to Unger's work, one that is cognizant of the
breadth and depth of his efforts, but one that is filtered through the
critical prism of feminist analysis.
142 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 592.
143 Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 153.
144 Ibid at 208.
145 The most useful source is "Symposium on Unger's Politics" (1987), 81 Nw. U. L. Rev.
589-951. See also, P. Anderson, "Roberto Unger and the Politics of Empowerment" (1989)
102 New Left Review 93; S. Holmes, "he Professor of Smashing" New Republic (19 October
1987); and A- Fraser "Reconstituting Enlightened Despotism" Telos (forthcoming).
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IV. POINTS OF INTERSECTION BETWEEN UNGER AND
FEMINISM
A. The Persona the Politica and the Hierarchical
As critics of contemporary society, Unger and many feminists
share a great deal in common, politically, philosophically, and
methodologically. First and foremost, they agree that there is no
aspect of human interaction that can be devoid of political
significance or impact. Feminism's proposition that "the personal is
the political" and Unger's maxim that "it is all politics" are both
direct challenges to legal liberalism's effort to distinguish between
the public and the private, a strategy designed to depoliticize aspects
of social interaction by means of a definitional fiat. Both recognize
that within the public/private dichotomy there is embedded a series
of power-laden assumptions that reflect and enforce a partisan - i.e.,
non-natural, contingent, and partial - vision of the appropriate
nature of the conditions of social interaction.
An interconnected idea common to both feminists and Unger
is a belief that the pervasive stereotypes and roles which structure
our mutual interaction are hierarchical and are therefore conducive
to the continuance of domination and subordination. In so far as
these socially constructed and ascribed roles swallow the person, they
deny our individual potentials, legitimate the status quo, and forestall
substantive equality. The whole point of Unger's empowered
democracy is to allow us to break free from stereotypical structural
constraints. A central aspiration of feminism is to create a society
in which one's gender is not a liability.
Apart from these critical political intersections, which I shall
return to below, there are also several methodological
correspondences that suggest a moment of progressive nexus
between Unger and feminism.146
146 The following paragraphs draw upon and are structured by Jill McCalla Vickers'
excellent article "Memoirs of an Ontological Exile: The Methodological Rebellions of Feminist
Research" in A. Miles & G. Finn, eds, Feminism in Canada: From Pressure to Politics
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1982) 27 [hereinafter Feminism in Canada]. Again, to
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B. Contextualism
Perhaps the most important methodological insight of feminism
is its critique of the "malestream," positivistic predilection for
decontextualization and abstraction: the imperative to approach
understanding through the tunnels of male identified rational
analysis, with its pretensions to objectivity and neutrality. The
positive dynamic engendered by such a critique is
recontextualization: the preference to think and understand in situ,
the ambition to comprehend the world experientially, from the
bottom up.
While recontextualizing is extremely important, particularly
insofar as it attempts to break down the subject/object dichotomy
and identifies common experiences across diverse planes, the feminist
awareness of the significance of contexts at times seems only to go
so far as advancing a preference for the specific over the abstract.
Despite its virtues, this approach may not develop the potential of
contextualism far enough. The feminist approach to contextualism
runs the risk of simply identifying the plethora of incompatible,
individualized subjectivities, a particularism that may be no more
than the inversion of abstraction and therefore allowing abstraction
to remain the bench-mark. Even more problematic still,
contextualism may turn out to be a potential prop for relativism and
skepticism, perspectives which, as I have posited, contribute to
disempowerment.
Like feminists, Unger is methodologically post-positivist.
Unger's theory of formative contexts may be of useful analytical and
transformative value for feminism. Although, regrettably, Unger fails
to do so,147 it may be possible to understand patriarchy as a central
component of our contemporary formative context, both
imaginatively and institutionally 48 Such a move serves a dual
emphasize the point, of course not all feminists are in consensus about each of McCalla
Vickers' propositions, but, as far as my understanding goes, her reflections capture some of
the key themes of feminist epistemology.
147 False Necessiy, supra, note 3 at 441.
148 It seems to me that patriarchy clearly fits Unger's two criteria of membership in a
formative context: the subjective and the objective standards. bid at 61-66.
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purpose: first, it helps identify the pervasiveness of androcentricity,
and secondly, and I think more importantly, it suggests its
contingency. To elaborate, Unger's theory of formative contexts,
with its insistence on the non-monolithic and transient character of
any society, allows feminists to posit the possibility of the
transcendence of patriarchy. Restated, patriarchy is neither
permanent nor necessary. It is simply a social artifact, although an
especially pervasive, tenacious, and resilient one. Such an
understanding helps feminism to avoid over-emphasizing the
repressive hegemony of phallocentrism 49 and thus reinforces
feminism's pursuit of empowerment. In particular, it encourages
reflections upon and the expansion of the deviances from and
exceptions to androcentric norms and values in order to derange and
destabilize patriarchy's repressive normalcy. Moreover, the Ungerian
analysis of reconstructive praxis suggests that the everyday run of the
mill tensions between men and women encapsulate - and could be
escalated into - larger scale disturbances of anti-egalitarian relations.
Childcare and housework are the two obvious examples. Anti-
necessitarian social theory in the support of feminism helps to
reinspire the politics of hope.150
C. Restoration of Agency
The Ungerian emphasis on the emancipatory power of his
theory of formative contexts dovetails, to some extent, with the
feminist emphasis on the centrality of human agency. Feminists
argue that traditional malestream understandings of the world - for
example, functionalism, structuralism, and Marxism - have developed
a "context-stripping" analytical discourse that abolishes agency. The
problem with such a discourse is that it locates social explanations
149 In particular, I am thinking about the generally pessimistic tone of Catharine
MacKinnon's Feminism Unmodified. Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1987) [hereinafter Feminism Unmodified]. See also her claim that patriarchy
is "metaphysically nearly perfect" in "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Towards a
Feminist Jurisprudence" (1983) 8 Signs 635 at 638. It seems to me that "nearly perfect" is to
feminism what "relative autonomy' is to neo-Marxism, tantalizingly suggestive but explanatorily
and empoweringly deficient. The difficult questions remain: How relative and how nearly?
150 See, generally, my Nomos and Thanatos (Part B), supra, note 2.
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in abstractions, with the correlative underemphasis on the
significance of human responsibility for such activity, whether it is
praiseworthy or culpable:
Human action is sterilized and pasteurized into a parade of forces, factors, roles,
structures, institutions, stereotypes, rights, constraints, customs, attitudes, and influences
- to name but a few... It is clear that categorizing something as a custom, rite or
whatever explains little of its origins, purposes or whose interests it serves. In fact, it
appears to explain away just those things we need to understand. 151
Unger's modernist inspired argument that both society and people
are artifactual and his proposition that "it is all politics" also
highlight the importance of human agency. Whereas feminists have
appropriately used the insight to highlight male responsibility for
the inequality and subordination of women, Unger puts this
awareness to an even more affirmative use: what has been made
can be unmade and that we could make ourselves and our societies
more open, more egalitarian, less oppressive.' 5 2
D. Rebellion against Linearity, Inevitability, and Laws
A third theme grows out of the former two themes.153
Feminists have been particularly concerned about the patriarchal,
positivistic preoccupation with linearity, coherence, predictability, and
regularity. Feminists suggest that such a perspective incorporates a
preference for stability, closure, and certainty. The problem is that
such desiderata tend to take on an authoritarian dynamic in that
they begin to insist on naturalness, universality, and inevitability, not
only as the criteria of epistemological validity, but also as the
foundations of a viable social structure. None of this sits well with
feminists who have been on the receiving end of such pretensions
to naturalism (for example, in relation to child-bearing) and whose
151 Feminism in Canada, supra, note 146 at 39.
152 I will suggest later, however, that Unger does fall back into the trap of
decontextualization in that he fetishizes the concept of plasticity.
153 McCalla Vickers also identifies another theme of feminism, which she describes as
"reversal," a concept that is a more generalized version of the strategy of "blaming the victim."
Feminism in Canada, supra, note 146 at 29. I see no such parallel theme in Unger.
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central aspiration has been to challenge normalcy, to make their
lives different and less nonnal than they tend to be.
Again, there are important parallels with Unger. Unger's most
developed idea in Politics is anti-necessitarianism: the espousal of
contingency, transience, and malleability and the rejection of
constraining, pseudo-naturalistic inevitabilities. He, too, recognizes
the nexus between essentialism and the dominant power order.
Both feminism and Unger see humanity as a "self-making species"
and they reject any attempt to limit this potential for self and
societal transformation as an insidious, preservative strategy that
constructs knowledge as a repressive politics.
E. The Rebellion Against Objectivity
The final point of intersection between the feminist and
Ungerian methodological critiques is their rejection of objectivity.
Both approaches recognize that because of the centrality of
contextualism, agency, and openness, it is impossible to cling to the
liberal or positivistic aspiration to neutrality. They insist that the
"view from nowhere" is either impossible or fraudulent and that
difficult political preferences are pervasive and appropriate 54
There is no archimedean point, it is all up for grabs.
If these tentative suggestions as to the political, epistemological,
and methodological correlations between Unger and feminism are
accurate, then it suggests that there may be some common ground
to lay the foundation for a conversation between critical theory ti la
Unger and feminism. If a conversation is possible, if there exists a
common - or at least a translatable - interpretative framework, then
there may be scope for mutual support as well as mutual critique.
Even more optimistically, perhaps such a debate can assist us in our
attempt to transcend the modernist malaise, our aspiration to
uncouple freedom and domination.
154 McCalla Vickers also points out that feminists understand objectivity in a second
sense, as related to objectification. lbid. at 40. I will suggest later that Unger's concept of
plasticity also commits this error.
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V. UNGERIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO FEMINISM
I have already indicated one way in which Unger's analysis may
be of utility to feminism, that is, the suggestion that patriarchy be
understood as a central component of our current formative context.
In this section, I want to consider other ways in which Unger's
"critical social theory, reinforced by political vision and enriched by
detailed institutional proposals and experiments, 155 may be of use
to contemporary feminist theory and practice.
A. Contours of the Feminist Political Agenda
As a radical social movement, feminism is in many ways still in
embryonic form. Its major emphases and successes have, in the
main, been in the realm of critique, rather than reconstruction.
Feminists have effectively highlighted the unjustifiable exclusion and
inferiorization of women from and in every cultural sphere, including
law. However, largely due to the hegemony of patriarchy, it has
been difficult for feminism to articulate what the substantive
difference of a feminist future might be. Consequently, the
predominant tendency within feminism, at least until recently, has
been a demand for access, the aspiration for equal opportunity.
Although vital, this essentially liberal feminist stance is mired by
downside risks, most significantly, the danger that feminism will
become just another constituency in liberal pluralism's interest group
lottery. The unfortunate result is that not a lot is done to
adumbrate what a feminized society, state, or economy might look
like.
In so far as there have been serious efforts to give some
indication as to the future direction of feminism, there has been
little agreement amongst feminists. In particular, feminist discourse
has centred around what can be characterized as "equalitarianism"
155 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 377.
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and "difference. 1s 6 However, in part because the stakes are so high,
this debate has been difficult, resulting in confrontations that have
on occasion been acrimonious and potentially divisive. On a
politico-methodological level, Unger may be able to provide an
opportunity for feminists to avoid an either/or choice that would
necessitate abandoning either equality or difference, thereby enabling
feminists to legitimately, coherently, and politically wisely to hold on
to both ends of the chain.
Unger posits that every radical social movement must develop
the fertile terrain between reform and revolution. He proposes that
such movements, if they are to have any chance of success, must
develop a dynamic fusion of internal development and visionary
imagination.15 7  Put differently, there must be a capacity to work
from within, to deviate, to expand, and to remake the familiar and
normal into the novel and transcendent, while being simultaneously
informed, guided, and inspired by a transformative vision. This
symbiosis allows a progressive movement to eclipse the false
dichotomy of fruitless reform and utopian somnambulance.
It seems to me that these two levels of transgressive strategy
currently co-exist within the feminist movement. On the one side,
there exists the potential to internally develop and expand the
liberal commitment to equality, to remake equality into a substantive
reality.158 On the other side, there is the transformative vision of
difference and gynocentrism,15 9 a potential value structure that
156 This point about discourse is important. McCalla Vickers introduces her discussion
of agency through a reference to Mary Daly and the importance of "the power of naming,"
the idea that those who control the world, also control the language. The consequence is that
those who want to challenge entrenched power must also challenge the dominant discourse
and this requires the development of an alternative discourse - both in form and substance.
See generally M. Daly, Websters' First New Intergalactic Wickedary of the English Language
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). This relates back to my previous suggestions on the language
adopted by Unger, supra, note 8.
157 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 355-62.
1 5 8 R. Abella, Equality In Employment: A Royal Commission Report: General Summary
(Toronto: Commission on Equality in Employment, 1984).
159 See, generally, T. Moi, ed., French Feminist Thought (New York: Blackwell, 1987);
C. Duchen, Feminism in France: From May '68 to Mitterand (Boston: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1986) [hereinafter Feminism in France]; E. Marks & I. de Courtivron, eds, New French
Feminisms: An Antholog (New York: Schocken Books, 1981); I. M. Young, "Humanism,
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challenges the hegemony of masculinist liberalism in the realm of
socio-political institutions, in the dynamics of social interaction,160
and even in our conceptions of human identity.161
Unger's proposal allows feminism to maintain both perspectives,
practices, and visions. Thus, when interpreted through the prism of
internal and visionary thought, equalitarianism and difference need
not be understood as antithetical. To the contrary, they can be
reconceptualized as radically and indispensably reinforcing, as
interconnected points on a transgressive continuum.162
B. Self and Community ... Solidarity and Care
Unger may also be able to make a significant contribution to
feminist reflections on the nature of the relationship between the
self and her community. In recent years, this debate has been
revived by the communitarian critique of liberalism.163 In essence,
the communitarians argue that the liberal preference for individual
liberty has gone too far, that it is premised upon a conception of
the self that is excessively atomistic, and that it ignores aspects of
the self that are constitutively interdependent upon others. The
political consequences of such a radically individualistic, some would
Gynocentrism and Feminist Politics" (1985) 8 Women's Studies Internal Forum 173; A. Miles,
'The Integral Feminine Principle in North American Feminist Radicalism" (1981) 4 Women's
Studies International Quarterly 481; and H. Eisenstein & A. Jardine, eds, The Future of
Difference (New York: Barnard College Women's Center, 1980).
160 See, generally, Feminism in Canada, supra, note 146 and N. Adamson, L. Briskin &
M. McPhail, Feminist Organizing for Change: The Contemporary Women's Movement in Canada
(Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1988).
161 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982) [hereinafter Voice]; D.T. Meyers & E.F.
Kittay, eds, Women and Moral Theory (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987); D.A.
Shogan, Care and Moral Motivation (Toronto: OISE Press, 1988).
162 For an important discussion of the political significance of a continuum, see A. Rich,
"Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" (1980) 5 Signs 631.
163 See, for example, MJ. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982); A-C. Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Virtue, 2d
ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); and C. Taylor, Philosophical
Papers: Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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say vacuous, understanding of the self are seen to be undesirable:
an impoverished conception of the community, the pervasiveness of
an instrumentalist approach to social interaction, increased anomie
and alienation, the collapse of consensus, and the abandonment of
any sense of a community nomos.
How have feminists responded to this debate? On the one
hand, liberalism with its emphasis on the individual and its
aspirations to enhance liberty through the pursuit of freely chosen
life plans, is clearly attractive to feminists in the light of a history
of rigorous restraint. It provides a vital opportunity for women to
free themselves from the constraints of a society that limits their
potential. Liberal individualism holds out the promise of equal
opportunity. Women have experienced the consensual nomos and
they have unpacked the deeply embedded coercive nature of
gemeinschaft relations. Feminists have recognized that the sense of
shared values is more apparent than real. They are some people's
values, i.e., men's, that are not just valued, but systemically and
coercively enforced - publicly and privately - with the correlative
devaluation, indeed repression, of women's values and aspirations.
Viewed in this light, communitarianism may be male hegemony in a
different guise.
At the same time, liberalism, despite its attractions, is both
problematic and insufficiently responsive. For some feminists, the
monadic vision of the self simply does not ring true for their
experiences of social interaction. Although they see the self as
fundamentally important, that is only part of the story, in that vital
elements of the self are based upon its capacity for human
interconnection.164 On a more explicitly political level, the ideology
of individualism is understood to be unresponsive to the existential
needs of women because it leaves too much up to the particularized
person, putting the burden of achievement completely on the
individuated self. The problem with this approach is that it pays
insufficient attention to the structures of inequality that frequently
inhibit the achievement of the very values that liberalism purports to
hold dear. To make individual self-fulfillment an obtainable ideal
164 See Voice, supra, note 161 and N. Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering
Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
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demands more than formal pretensions. It requires affirmative
community support, that is, proactive state intervention, but that
contradicts the liberal preference for neutrality.
Thus, once again, feminism follows its tendency for non-
alignment: it refuses to fit nicely into the traditional structures and
categories of politico-philosophical discourse. As Donna Greschner
suggests, feminism's response to both communitarianism and
individualism is "yes" and "no." There are elements in each tradition
that feminism rejects and aspires to, but feminism cannot be
identified with or reduced to either individualism or
communitarianism 1 65
It seems to me that, depending on how you read him, Unger
shares the same ambivalence as feminists about the
individualism/communitarian debate. Although in Knowledge he
advocated in favour of organic communities, drawing on a discourse
and vision that had strong communitarian overtones, he appears to
have abandoned this approach in Politics. In particular, he tends to
identify communitarianism with a repressive corporatism and/or civic
republicanism: "Consider what happens to the communal ideal when
it must be realized in a setting of recalcitrant but also resented
inequality. Every rebellion against dependence and domination takes
on the character of a betrayal of communal bonds, whereas fidelity
to these communal bonds requires submission to a hierarchal
order."1 66 Community, in this view, is "little more than the softening
halo of a brutal power system."1 67 However, another response to
the question of the connection between self and other that appears
to have stayed with Unger throughout his work is the mediating
concept of solidarity. Unfortunately, its meaning and significance
appear to have gone through several, not necessarily compatible,
transmutations.
In his earliest work, Unger seems to understand solidarity as a
substantive, normative vision for social interaction, a regulative ideal.
165 D. Greschner, "Feminist Concerns with the New Communitarians: We Don't Need
Another Hero" in A.C. Hutchinson & L.J.M. Green, Law and the Community (Toronto:
Carswell, 1989) 119.
166 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 387.
1 6 7 bid
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For example, he describes it as "love struggling to move beyond the
circle of intimacy ... our feeling of responsibility for those whose
lives touch in some way upon our own and our greater or lesser
willingness to share their fate." Or again:
The kernel of solidarity is our feeling of responsibility for those whose lives touch in
some way upon our own and our greater or lesser willingness to share in their fate.
Solidarity is the social face of love: it is concern with another as a person rather than
just respect for him [sic] as a bearer of formally equal rights and duties or admiration
for his [sic] gifts and achievements. 1 6 8
Understood in this strong substantive sense, solidarity suggests that
we mediate (for we can never eliminate) the tension between self
and other, not by a self-sacrificing of the self, nor by a callous
disregard of the other, but by an earnest sense of responsibility for
their destiny, a willingness to attempt to experience the world from
their existential base, and further, to attempt to make the world
more responsive to their needs. Read in this light, solidarity attempts
to reconcile the alienating and latently destructive dualism of self
and other.169
I would suggest that such a conception of solidarity dovetails
with the espousal by some feminists - for example Carol Gilligan
and Joan Tronto170 - of an ethic of care. The central insight of an
ethic of care is a consciousness of the constitutive interconnection
and interdependence of the self and other. This sense of mutuality
militates against isolation and separatism, with their potential for
selfishness, aggression, and violence. An ethic of care encourages
enthusiasm for an awareness of the needs of others, a willingness
to respond compassionately and responsibly to those needs,171 and
168 Knowledge, supra, note 6 at 206.
169 Feminism in Canada, supra, note 146 at 29-31.
170 1 Tronto, "Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care" (1987) 12 Signs 644;
"Women and Caring: What Can Feminists Learn About Morality From Caring" in A. Jaggar
and S. Bordo, eds, Body Gender and Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and
Knowing (New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 1989) 172; "Rationalizing Racism,
Sexism, and Other Forms of Prejudice: Otherness in Moral and Feminist Theory".
[unpublished manuscript].
171 Voice, supra, note 161 at 62, 74-98.
1990]I 697
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
to participate in the lived experiences and reality of others.1 72  It
identifies "a world of mutuality" that "creates and sustains the human
community. 173 It reconceptualizes and reconstructs moral dilemmas
to be issues of competing responsibilities of the self because of its
connection with and responsibility for others, rather than a conflict
between self and other in which the only options are assertion of
the self's trumping rights or martyred self-sacrifice on the pyre of
altruism.174 For Gilligan, the ethic of care aspires to "a more
generative view of human life,' 17s one that rejects freedom that is
built on the back of subordination and thereby pursues an
affirmative transformation of the polity.
However, it is important to point out that, on my
understanding, the ethic of care is distinct from the traditional
masculinist stereotype of "female self-abnegation and moral self-
sacrifice,"1 76 what Virginia Woolf has described as "The Angel in the
172 Ibid. at 79. A similar theme can also be located in M. Minow, "Justice Engendered"
(1987) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10 at 14: "the commitment to seek out and appreciate a perspective
other than one's own."
173 Voice, ibid. at 156.
174 Ibid. at 114.
175 Ibid. at 174.
176 Ibid. at 9. See also, I. Marcus & P. Spielgelman, "Feminist Discourse, Moral Values
and the Law - A Conversation" (1985) 34 Buffalo L. Rev. 46 [hereinafter Discourse].
Deborah Kearns suggests that even the most sophisticated and progressive liberal of the late
twentieth century incorporates a vision of women as self-sacrificing into his work: see "A
Theory of Justice - and Love; Rawls on the Family" (1983) 18 Politics 36. For a powerful
critique of this "denial" interpretation of women's identity, see Robin West's groundbreaking
article '"he Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Liberal
and Radical Feminist Legal Theory" Wisconsin Women's L.J. (forthcoming). Vest argues
that, if women are accurately understood as "giving selves," this has come about because of
the "pervasive threat of violent and acquisitive male sexuality" which has resulted in women
driven by fear "re-constituting themselves in a way that controls the danger and suppresses the
fear.... This does not make her an altruistic person, it makes her a negative." Ibid. at 15, 22.
In other words, women's identity as "giving selves" is a "coherent, understandable" defence
mechanism to survive patriarchal oppression, not authentic feminism. As the text makes clear,
the ethic of care approach does not reduce women to an interpretation as "giving selves," it
is not a servile interpretation of women's moral character and promise. Indeed, later in her
paper West also considers the possibility of an ethic of care absent the dangers of patriarchy.
Ibid at 38. See also her reflections on the importance of trust in human relations: Ibid at
61-62.
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House."177  It should not be confused with passivity or delicacy,
submissiveness or obedience, dependence or domesticity. It is
neither what Irigaray has posited to be a "phallic feminine,"178 nor
''a romantic prescription for chaining women to the classical
definition of femininity."'179 Indeed, Gilligan's own example refutes
such self-negation, for at least some of the women to whom she
listened had had abortions, thereby demonstrating that care does not
necessarily prioritize the other over the self. Rather, it attempts to
consider the interests of the other in a responsive and responsible
manner. Thus, although the ethic of care necessitates a keen
consciousness of the "social consequences of action, '1 80  it also
includes care for oneself.181
If the ethic of care and solidarity share as much in common as
I have suggested they do, then the homology allows us to mediate
the concern raised by some feminists that the ethic of care is at
bottom male ventriloquism: the only place that women are allowed
to be, because that is all that men, in their politico-cultural
supremacy, have valued women for. Catharine MacKinnon is a
leading advocate of this perspective. She argues that it is impossible
to articulate the authentic voice of women because "the foot is on
the throat," suggesting that an espousal of the ethic of care as a
177V. Woolf, Vuginia Woolf. Women and Writing (London: Women's Press, 1979) at
59.
178 Feminism in France, supra, note 159 at 87.
179 K. Karst, "Women's Constitution" (1984) Duke LJ. 447 at 480. Emphatically,
although there is some verbal intersection, the ethic of care is not what MacKinnon has
described as "contemporary industrial society's version of woman ... docile, soft, passive,
nurturant, vulnerable, weak narcissistic, childlike, incompetent, masochistic and domestic, made
for child care, home care and husband care." See "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State:
An Agenda for Theory' (1982) 7 Signs 515 at 530. Moreover, lest there be any confusion,
I want to stress that nothing in my suggestions is premised upon the idea that the ethic of
care grows out of the rosy private family life of women. For many women, the family is
anything but "a haven in a heartless world." It is, in many instances, itself the locus of
extreme domination, subordination, inequality, and violence.
180 Voice, supra, note 161 at 167.
181 Ibid. at 139.
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feminist ethic may be an insidious strategy of anti-feminism.18 2
Solidarity, or its cognate the ethic of care, need not be the
imposition of a disempowering male stereotype upon women.
Instead, we can conceive of it as a corrigible vision of reconstruction
for progressive persons of both genders to pursue, a vision that
capitulates to neither communitarianism nor individualism.
In this way, Unger, or more accurately the younger Unger, can
make a positive contribution to feminism in its attempt to resolve
tension between self and other: a contribution that provides the
foundation for a corrigible substantive societal vision capable of
challenging the cynical, fatalistic twilightenment ideology, but one
that is in no way premised upon biological determinism. As we shall
see in my discussion of the potential feminist critique, unfortunately
the older Unger appears to retreat from such a strong conception of
solidarity.
C. Institutional Reconstruction
Another vitally important contribution which Unger can make
to feminism is his proposals for institutional reconstruction. As we
have seen, Unger's primary criticism of the basic structure of society
is that its institutions are primarily preservative: they are designed
to reinforce existing cultural patterns, rather than to change them.
Women are obviously disadvantaged by such structural
conservativism. Unger's alternative is to remake the basic structure
so as to be structure-revising, rather than structure-preserving.
Women could potentially benefit from such reconstructive openness,
in that the basic structure would be rendered more congenial to
their differential demands. In this section, I will provide only a few
illustrative examples, one each from the economic, legal and political
realms of social interaction. Many other suggestions could be found.
182 See "Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination" in Feminism Unmodified,
supra, note 149 at 32. If authenticity is identified with essentialism, then MacKinnon has a
point. But I don't think Gilligan, for example, is attempting to make such a universal or total
claim.
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1. Economic
a) Liquefaction of task-definition and task-execution
Take, for example, Unger's proposals that the conditions of
labour be rendered more plastic by softening the distinction between
task-definition and task-execution and that greater financial support
be provided by the state through the rotating capital fund for
innovative workers, technicians, or entrepreneurs. As the economic
structure is currently set up, it is difficult for women either to make
it into the centralized ranks of decision makers1 83 or to successfully
enter or remain in the market as independent actors. Increasingly,
in part due to their gradually increasing autonomy and driven by the
necessity of the feminization of poverty, women are attempting to
make a go of it on their own in the market. Frequently, these
women entrepreneurs do not draw any line between task-definition
and task-execution and they could certainly benefit from the support
of the rotating capital fund with its ability to decentralize market
power. Moreover, Unger's insistence on the "perpetual breakdown
of status and hierarchy" reinforces the dynamic to undermine sex
role stereotyping by providing opportunities for women to develop
their potentials for self-assertion, to be innovative and dynamic.
As far as my research has gone, feminist scholars and activists
have not devoted much energy to the task of proposing macro-
economic reconstruction,1 8 4 a lacuna in their practice that is
particularly worrisome (although from another perspective
understandable) given the centrality of economics in structuring
social interaction. Unger's proposals could therefore prove very
helpful in this arena.
183 R. Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (New York: Basic Books,
1977).
184 For some tentative suggestions, see, however, Women's Poverty, supra, note 109; B.
Bergman, "Feminism and Economics" (1983) 69(5) Academe 22; N.J. Sokoloff, Between Money
and Love: The Dialectics of Women's Home and Market Work (New York: Praeger, 1980);
and C.C. Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy,
and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
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2. Legal
a) Disaggregation of the consolidated property right
Similarly, Unger's undoubtedly controversial proposal for the
disaggregation of the consolidated property right could be of crucial
importance for women, both imaginatively and economically. The
consolidated property right is the idea that property has one
essential meaning: the property owner has an exclusive,
unchallengeable, permanent, possessive right to subjects or objects.
Unger denies the hegemony of this conception of property, positing
that other variations on the idea of a property right are conceivable,
workable, and desirable if we really do aspire to a more egalitarian
society. Unger's disaggregated property right allows for conditional
individual and group claims to portions of the social capital.
I would suggest that many males premise their interactions with
females, both intimate and removed, within the paradigm of the
consolidated property right. Whether they interact with women as
companions or as others who provide services, there may be an
instrumentalism in such relationships that denies the equality and
integrity of women. In so far as the disaggregation of the
consolidated property right would decentre the ideology of
dehumanizing, possessive instrumentality, it provides scope for the
improvement of women's lives.
Further, the consolidated property right, as an instrument of
domination, impacts on women's life experiences in another more
tangible way. One of the greatest problems for women on divorce
has been the amounts of and access to income and maintenance
payments and the resultant phenomenon of the feminization of
poverty l85 A central reason for this problem is that malestream
thinking about the division of property and ongoing support after
the dissolution of marriage is premised in part upon the ideology of
the consolidated property right. This translates into the deeply
embedded belief that the property is really the husband's - especially
if the woman is a homemaker - and that it is only in the interest
185 LJ. Wietzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic
Consequences for Women and Children in America (New York: Free Press, 1985).
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of formal equality and fairness that we are redistributing his wealth
for her benefit. Such a preconception reinforces a reluctance to be
too generous to the wife and to fully consider what her real needs
might be in a society which still systematically discriminates against
women. However, if we no longer clung to such a possessive
conception of property, if we reinterpreted property rights in a more
open and contingent manner, if we understood wealth as societal
rather than possessive and individualistic, if women could claim both
destabilization and solidarity rights, then perhaps their economic
situation post-divorce may not be so strained l8 6
b) Equality of Circumstance
And again, Unger's proposal that the state guarantee a
minimum of welfare entitlements to provide "equality of circum-
stance" helps to undermine the economic coercion which forces
some women to remain in unfulfilling or harmful relationships. It
would also allow other women the opportunity to experiment with
and develop alternative lifestyles to those which restrict them to the
confines of gender stereotyping.
What these discussions of Unger's economic and legal proposals
indicate is that a reconstruction of the economy - on the basis of
the disaggregation of the consolidated property right and the
establishment of a rotating capital fund, supported by a regime of
destabilization, solidarity, and welfare rights - though, perhaps,
incapable of eradicating the feminization of poverty, can make a
significant contribution. It is a contribution that feminists simply
cannot afford to ignore in the light of liberal reform agendas that,
even in their best light, have not produced the expected results or,
less optimistically, have backfired.
186 There is, of course, a downside risk for some women in the abandonment of the
consolidated property right. Some of the main benefactors of the women's movement have
been middle class women, whose access to wealth and power is dependent upon the
consolidated property right. Inevitably, they may lose out. But I think feminism must make
a choice between gaining access to the politics of privilege or attempting to reconstruct the
polity itself.
1990]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
3. Political
a) Liquefaction: feminism and constitutional reform
A couple of examples from the political realm might also help.
The Ungerian critique of the contemporary political structure and
processes echoes the critique of economic and legal relations: they
are conservative, preservative, and anti-democratic. Nowhere does
this become more obvious than through a reflection upon the nature
of constitutions: because of their importance they tend to be
inflexible, requiring exceptional procedures for transformation. To
avoid the sclerosis induced by such "demobilizing
constitutionalism,"18 7 Unger suggests that we liquefy the distinction
between entrenched constitutional politics and a more volatile
normal politics.
Feminists, I suggest, could be benefactors of such a liquefaction.
Take, for example, the efforts of Canadian feminists to have their
equality rights entrenched in the Charter, the resistance, and the
extraordinary lengths they were required to go, both provincially and
federally, to achieve recognition.188  Witness also, their
marginalization throughout the Meech Lake constitutional process
through which eleven men came to an agreement which, if ratified,
will render constitutional reform almost impossible.189
Or again, we can reflect on the impact of the American
constitutional structure on the campaign for the ERA. The
mobilization generated by feminists was phenomenal, having a major
impact on local and state politics, but coming up against the brick
wall of the procedures of constitutional amendment.1 90  If
187 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 459.
188 C. Hosek, "How Canadian Women Fought for Equality" in K. Banting & R. Simeon,
eds, And No One Cheered Federalism, Democracy and the Constitution Act (Toronto:
Methuen, 1983); P. Kome, The Taking of Twenty-Eight: Women Challenge the Constitution
(Toronto: Women's Press, 1983).
189 A- DobrowoIsky, Promises Unfulfilled: Women and the Theory and Practice of
Representative Democracy in Canada (M.A. Thesis, Political Science, Dalhousie University,
1990) [unpublished] [hereinafter Promises].
190 J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).
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liquefaction had taken place, if constitutional politics were structured
so as to be more responsive and less resistant to demands for social
and political change, then constitutionally sanctioned inequality
would possibly not be a foundation for the contemporary American
polity.
Moreover, such openness would encourage greater recourse to
the institutions of participatory democracy and would enable those
groups who are discriminated against in society to be less dependent
on the paternalistic good will of lesser democratic bodies, such as
the courts.
VI. FEMINIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNGER
A. The Trashing Job
Despite all of these potential correspondences between Unger
and the feminist agenda, for some reason that I simply cannot
understand, Unger leaves himself open to an easy trashing job by
feminists.
He, too, is guilty of all the sins of omission that feminists have
identified as characteristic of malestream ideology. Rarely does he
adopt gender neutral language and even less occasionally is there
any specific discussion of gender related issues. Although he spends
hundreds of pages discussing production, the economy, and work,
issues such as reproduction, the sexual division of labour, and their
fundamental economic significance never get a mention. At other
times, he discusses the "main traditions" of political thought -
liberalism, libertarianism, socialism, communitarianism, communism,
social democracy, even civic republicanism - but with nary a
reference to feminism. Viewed in this light, the parallels with Kant,
Hegel, and Marx may be less than flattering. 91
Moreover, I suspect that one of the things that feminists will
have heard about Politics is the reference, in manuscript form, to the
parallel between Ungerian empowerment and de Sadean sexual
191 L Clark & L. Lange, eds, The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and
Reproduction from Plato to Nietzche (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979).
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innovation. No doubt, a good feminist deconstructionist could
unpack this now omitted reference 92 to unmask Unger's anti-
feminism and to cast him onto the already overflowing scrap-heap of
unsalvagable malestream ideology.
However, I think such a response would be too hasty. For
although there is much in Politics that can be criticized from a
feminist perspective, as I have indicated, there is also much that
merits serious attention if feminism aspires to make its own
transformative vision realizable. What I want to do in this section
is to discuss some of the critical contributions which feminists can
make to Unger that will be to their mutual benefit.
B. The Assumption of Conflict
Undoubtedly, one of the things that feminists will notice about
Politics is the disturbingly adversarial discourse adopted by Unger.
The treatise is pervaded by a truculent and belligerent vocabulary.
For example, "war," "assault," "fighting," "smashing," "crack,"
"dismember," and "shatter" provide some of the fundamental
metaphors of the work. In and of itself, such terminology may not
merit too great a concern. However, it appears to be symptomatic
of a much more fundamental aspect of the Ungerian agenda. As
Jill McCalla Vickers asks: "why [is] Western man's conception of
himself, of us, and of nature so destructive?"1 93
Unger is very explicit that the programme of reconstruction
will require conflict, if only for the reason that those who benefit
from cultural conditions as currently constituted will be reluctant to
surrender their advantages. But he also goes much further in
arguing that for progress to be realizable, conflict must continue:
"The path to equality passes through conflict. Otherwise it is likely
to lead to a mirage."194 Within this Ungerian scheme of things, it
seems that conflict is the very kernel of our transgressive potential,
the guarantee of our irrepressible ability for individual self assertion
192 False Necessily, supra, note 3 at 579.
193 Feminism in Canada, supra, note 146 at 28.
194 Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 67.
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and breach of context, the dynamic that "keeps us infinite within the
finite." Indeed, he seems to go so far as to claim that this talent for
context smashing, filtered through the matrix of societal conflict, is
the empowering fulcrum of our potential as human beings. Without
it we would stagnate.
Unger does recognize that some will object to this stance, in
particular, he identifies classical republicans with such a critique..9 5
His response is that the republican vision of consensus is a myth,
that republicanism has never been a realistic political possibility, and
that consensus theory legitimates hierarchy, domination, and
disciplinary conservativism. For Unger, "the denaturalization of
society through conflict"1 96 has the advantage of historical precedent
and successes that have resulted in extended emancipation.
Although there is truth in Unger's position, it is also
problematic. We must not forget that conflict also has a history of
subordination and domination, imperialism and violence, genocide
and torture. This side of conflict cannot be simply hidden in the
closet of history. Moreover, it is interesting that Unger should
choose republicanism as his foil, when at least some feminists are
concerned about the negative consequences of conflict on both the
micro and macro levels.197  As Catharine MacKinnon has
sardonically noted, "Conflict [may be] a peculiarly ejaculatory means
of conflict resolution."198 More specifically, why should the choice
be between conflict and consensus? Could we not understand
peoples' differing perspectives and disagreements as socio-political
tensions emerging from our differing experiences, interests, and
desires, as disputes necessitating resolution? Such a perspective
acknowledges the lack of consensus, but does not necessarily
embrace as inevitable an assumption of conflict. As Gilligan's
research on women's decision-making in relation to abortion
suggests, interests may be incompatible, even irreconcilable, but that
195 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 558, 586-87.
196 Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 52.
197 He suggests that alternative viewpoints are "literally incredible," a position that is
clearly premised upon on the complete absence of feminism from his analysis. False Necessity,
supra, note 3 at 560.
198 Discourse, supra, note 176 at 23.
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need not necessarily result in a conflictual understanding of the
process 99 And what of Unger's own idea of solidarity? What is the
relationship between solidarity and conflict?
C. The Retreat from Solidarity
As I indicated earlier, the young Unger developed a strong
conception of solidarity, relying on it as a partial foundation for his
programme of reconstruction. Solidarity, as a cognate of love, as a
response to the needs of others, as an alternative formulation for
the ethic of care, does not fit well with Unger's more recent
celebrations of conflict.
This lack of fit can only be explained if we understand Unger's
later work as backing away from such a strong conception of
solidarity towards a more tentative perspective. In Passion, the
concept seems to transmute from a regulative ideal for the
mediation of the tensions of social interaction to a restatement or
reformulation of the tensions themselves. Unger's powerful
discussions of the "genealogy of the passions," in that essay, is built
around his understanding of our shared experiences as human
beings, of our unlimited mutual need and fear, longing and jeopardy,
interdependence and vulnerability, which he describes as "the
problem of solidarity." Although the book makes clear Unger's own
preference - that we should develop our lives and our society so as
to be more open to the redemptive power of love, towards greater
trust and vulnerability - his approach characterizes solidarity as the
problem, not the solution. Solidarity and love are now disconnected.
The dualism which solidarity had originally sought to mediate
appears to have been revived.
This retreat from solidarity, as it might be called, is further
reinforced through an analysis of Politics. Although solidarity does
continue to maintain a position in the Ungerian scheme of things,
it is lamentably underdeveloped. It is more a subterranean
aspiration than a mediating corrective vision. Unger does provide
that solidarity rights should be constitutionally encouraged and that
199 Voice, supra, note 161.
[VOL. 28 No. 3
A Critical Review of Unger's Politics
law, more generally, should reinforce the dynamic of reliance and
trust. Moreover, the closing four pages of the centrepiece work
False Necessity once again return to the problematic relationship
between empowerment and solidarity to suggest obliquely that the
two need not be incompatible.2°° Apart from these rather sparse
references,20 1 the remainder of this one thousand page opus is
preoccupied with his espousal of unmitigated conflict.
The problem then, as I see it, is that Unger has lost control
of the idea of conflict. Conflict has taken on a life of its own in
Politics. It has been elevated to the level of a generative and
indefatigable imperative that comes dangerously close to an
authoritarian impulse that trammels any other mediating concept.
Viewed from this perspective, the destructive potential latent in
dualistic thought (the conflict between self and other) comes front
and centre threatening to eradicate completely the countervailing,
mediating, and directive power of solidarity. To me, this comes
close to a depressing surrender to necessitarianism and an
unjustifiably impoverished "vision for society and project for
individuals. 202
D. Power and Plasticity
These reflections on conflict also suggest that attention should
be paid to Unger's conception of power. Despite the rhetoric of
"empowerment," Politics betrays a unilateral conception of power.
It understands power in the Weberian sense of "power over,"203 a
200 Disturbingly, the last word of False Necessity, is a failed attempt to revive any hope
we might have for solidarity, for solidarity transmutes to "sweet.' Supra, note 3 at 595.
201 Unger does admit that solidarity is "downplayed" and that empowerment a la Politics
"fails to make up the whole of a defensible social ideal." However, this turns out to be more
of a strategy of confession and avoidance, than an attempt to come to terms with this lacuna.
]bid. at 592.
202 biT at 571.
203 Weber defines power as "the chance of a man or a number of men [sic] to realize
their will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in
the action." See H.H. Gerth & C.W. Mills, eds, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1958) at 180.
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negative and repressive approach, what Foucault identifies as a
juridical conception to power.204 But power is more than simply
pervasive and systemic, it is also heterogeneous, polymorphous, and
multifaceted.205 Power can also be understood in the sense of
"'power to" as well as "power over." "Power to" is power as a
cognate of freedom, a progressive, emancipatory, and potentially
transformative conception of power: a conception which emphasizes
the creative, capacity-enhancing, ability-encouraging variations of
power.20 6 This is a qualitatively different conception of power, one
that correlates more closely with the concept of "empowerment."
204 M. Foucault, PowerlKnowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, trans. C.
Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) [hereinafter PowerlKnowledge].
205 The following reflections on power are influenced in part by the work of Foucault.
He suggests that traditional conceptions of power are based upon three assumptions: (1)
power is possessed; (2) power is primarily coercive, it is a repressive prohibition backed by
sanctions; and (3) power is centralized and tends to be hierarchical, it flows from the top
down.
Foucault argues that these assumptions unduly constrain our understanding of power,
that power has many variations beyond the juridical conception. Thus, he argues first that
power is exercised rather than possessed, thereby emphasizing a more relational understanding
of power. Second, we can understand power is productive as well as repressive. This claim
becomes most apparent through his discussion of the connection between knowledge and
power. Knowledge as power constructs, creates, and moulds our understandings of ourselves,
our relations, and our world. Power, therefore, can be proactive and creative, rather than just
sanction-determined. Third, and as a correlative of his first and second theses, if power is
exercisable, relational, and creative, then it can be located elsewhere than in centralized
authorities. Put differently, power is a micro-phenomenon as well as a macro-phenomenon
(although the two are interrelated). It can be exercised through our everyday relations, from
the bottom up, as well as from the top down, as localized centres of resistance, reconstruction,
and empowerment, as well as domination, either on the micro or macro levels. See M.
Foucault, PowerlKnowledge, supra, note 204; Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison
(New York- Vintage Books, 1979); The History of Sexuality (New York: Vintage Books,
1980); J. Sawicki, "Foucault and Feminism: Toward a Politics of Difference" (1986) 2 Hypatia
23; and I. Diamond & L Quinby, eds, Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988).
Though I do not propose some meta-normative project, I am also more optimistic
than Foucault who resists envisioning transformation, mostly because of his anti-humanism,
his post-modern skepticism.
20 6 y. Cohen, "I'houghts on Women and Power" in Feminism in Canada, supra note 146
at 236. G. Finn, "On the Oppression of Women in Philosophy - Or, Whatever Happened to
Objectivity?" in ibid at 302. For example, certain of the privileges of citizenship can be
understood as "power to," rather than "power over." The Oxford English Dictionary also
suggests these various conceptions, beginning with "power to," but ending with "power over":
"the ability to do something ... possession of control or command over others; domination;
government; sway; authority ... ability to compel obedience ... wage war."
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Men may understand and use power in its imperialistic guise in
order to crush women, other men, and nature, but that does not
mean that "power over" is the immutable essence of power.
Feminism, with its substantive emphasis upon an ethic of care, may
pose the opportunity to conceptualize another, emancipatory side of
power: a side that expands our horizons rather than curtails them,
a side that nurtures our personhood rather than stultifies it, a side
that fosters care for the inherent human dignity of others.
Feminism, rather than working within and thereby reproducing the
androcentric interpretation/imposition of power, may be able to
challenge the very meaning of power itself.2°7
These concerns are further reinforced on a reading of Plasticity.
In this volume, Unger utilizes his anti-necessitarian perspective to
develop a revised practice of social and historical analysis that at
once has greater explanatory potential than its strongest rivals
(Marxism or modernization theory), as well as emphasizing the
human capacity for innovation, flexibility, and reconstruction. The
central thesis is that there is no pre-ordained path to societal
success. Rather, it is argued that those societies that have been
successful have been those who have recognized the importance of
plasticity - with its potential to weaken social division, roles, and
hierarchy - thereby facilitating the emergence of hitherto unforseen
innovations, the techniques of success. By connecting plasticity with
success, Unger links openness, empowerment, and radical democracy.
The problems begin, however, not with the theory but with its
application. Plasticity is a study of the enabling institutional
conditions of economic and military success. Although Unger's
purpose is relatively narrow historical revision, his choice of topics
leaves me rather uncomfortable. Unger's perilously close
identification of wealth and power with success, in my opinion, raises
207 It must be made clear that the extension of our understanding of power suggested
in the text is not a sentimentalized, romanticized approach. It is obvious to me that, if "power
over' and "power to" come into direct conflict, then the former will trump the latter. The
opportunity, however, that is implicated in the idea of "power to" is precisely to circumvent
and defuse the conflicts that make "power over" seem so inevitable and the consequences so
repressive, painful. In this light, power undimensionalized to "power over" is self-fulfilling and
viciously circular. To break that circle, we must reconceive the possibilities of dispute
resolution, to challenge the pervasiveness of dominance and dependence at its cognitive and
epistemological core.
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issues about his vision of the good society, concerns that relate back
to his almost euphoric espousals of conflict.208  I want to
concentrate on his discussions of military success.
No doubt, Unger is correct to identify the integral historical
connections between societal survival, growth, and expansion on the
one hand, with wealth and power, riches and force, on the other.
Yet there is a disturbing tendency to uncritically assume such
connections as inevitable, necessary. For example, throughout the
discussions there is a pervasive assumption that predatory
relationships between states are inevitable.209  This leads him to
claim that successful societies should always be in a state of military
preparedness, which, to me, sounds like a euphemism for militarism,
thanatical doublespeak.21° Thus, the recent efforts of Gorbachev to
modify the military tensions between the superpowers would be seen
as foolish and potentially fatal within the Ungerian scheme of things.
Unger's espousal of "plasticity or death"211 could be easily
interpreted as a justification for deterrence theory, the Reagan/Bush
administration's star wars initiative, the further development of the
new "invisible bomber," and continued nuclear build up, either
through the honing of cruise missiles or the serious consideration by
the Mulroney administration of the development of a fleet of
nuclear submarines. Furthermore, Unger's discourse of cold,
dispassionate detachment in his discussion of the techniques and
technologies of destruction on occasion almost crescendos into
eulogy. For example, he is particularly enthusiastic about the ability
of commando forces to transcend hierarchy by softening the
208 For example, at one point he describes the "repetition of war" as the "great wheel of
fortune." Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 147.
209 See also Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 56.
210 For some useful feminist reflections on militarism and pacifism, see S. Ruddick,
"Preservative Love and Military Destruction" in J. Trebilcot, ed., Mothering: Essays in Feminist
Theory (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984) 231; S. Ruddick, "Pacifying the Forces:
Drafting Women in the Interests of Peace" (1983) 8 Signs 471; D. Kruse & C. Sowerwine,
"Feminism and Pacifism: 'Women's Sphere' in Peace and War" in N. Grieve & A. Burns, eds,
Australian Women: New Feminist Perspectives (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1986) at
42; and N. Hartsock, '"The Barracks Community in Western Political Thought: Prologomena
to a Feminist Critique of War and Politics" in J. Stiehm, ed., Women and Men's Wars (New
York. Permagon Press, 1983) at 283.
211 Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 162.
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boundary between task-definition and task-execution. Immediately,
I am tempted to think of the plasticity, creativity, and ingenuity of
the R.U.C Special Branch shoot to kill policy in my native Northern
Ireland, where the execution aspect has been perfected into an
art.212  I am not enthusiastic about celebrating such destructive
innovation.
To be fair to Unger, there are at times indications that he is
not indefensibly sanguine about war. Although he refers to war's
"untrammelled violence" and its nightmarish aspects, critiquing
combat as "a retreat from love" and its "distorting nature," these
reservations are disturbingly underdeveloped. For someone whose
other work is in many ways premised upon the redemptive power
of love, optimistic about compassion, trust, reliance, and
vulnerability, he simply does not protest enough. Although we can
undoubtedly learn about the importance of plasticity through a
discussion of militarism - and I do not want to be understood as
saying that we should not discuss or attempt to understand our
history - Unger's position lacks a sufficiently critical component.
His critique is oriented against alternative theories of military
success, but not against militarism itself.213 His over-concentration
on the techniques of plasticity costs his critical credentials severely.
Rather than attempting to uncouple freedom and domination, his
espousals of plasticity only seem to rationalize the efficiency of
domination, to capitulate to the "cult of violence."214  It is a sad
thought, but Ungerian plasticity, unmodified as it is in Plasticity, may
only differ in degree from Posnerian efficiency. Like Conrad's Mr.
Kurtz, Mr. Unger may realize the horror only when its too late.
The problem with Plasticity is not its central thesis, the
unimaginable horizons opened up by plasticity, but the extent to
which the thesis is carried. Unger may have led us out of our
servitude to necessitarianism, opened up the waters of reform and
retrenchment which continually threaten to submerge us, and
provided guidance toward a better era, but only to abandon us in
212 1 Stalker, Stalker (London: Harrap, 1988).
213 "[T]he test of success that counts is the comparison of one war machine or industrial
economy with its closest and most threatening adversaries." Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 209.
214 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 584-85.
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the valley of mutually inflicted death. All too often his third volume
seems to suggest that conflict and militarism are essential conditions
for success. Success is defined as economic and military power, but
why should this be the case? If success is to be measured on these
criteria, with their potential for apocalyptic destruction, then,
perhaps, we don't want success or, perhaps, we need to redefine and
revalorize success to disentangle it from such a warped value
structure. If the gospel of plasticity is accurate, if necessitarianism
is part of the problem not the solution, then the spirit of the
Ungerian project demands that we question the assumption of
conflict that Unger entrenches in his own work so that we can
tentatively edge towards social recombination that does not require
seemingly endless baptisms of violence. To do this requires us to
inquire into the very nature of the modernist project itself, to query
whether our much vaunted progress is more apparent than real, to
wonder whether our achievements have been attained only at an
unconscionable cost, and to ponder whether our economic and
military successes have been self-deluding myths.
E. Plasticity is not Enough
Here, once again, I think Unger fails us. As I have indicated
earlier, Unger, with his unrepenting emphasis upon malleability and
the creative potential of humanity, is an archmodernist. The
problem that arises, I think, is that throughout his analysis there is
a dangerous tendency to reduce this creative capacity of humanity to
instrumentalism. 215  His over-concentration on and, perhaps,
excessive prioritization of the self-assertive potential, the context-
transcending talent, is disturbingly close to a will to empowerment
that lacks a sufficiently developed complement of intersubjectivity.
The fusion of reason and desire is too narrowly construed, over-
215 This concern about the ascendency of instrumentalist reason grows out of another
tradition of critical theory, most commonly identified with the Frankfurt School. See,
generally, T. Adorno & M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. J. Cumming (New
York: Seabury Press, 1972); T. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York:
Seabury Press, 1973); and M. Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: Continuum, 1974);
J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. JJ. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press,
1971).
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emphasizing technique at the expense of interconnection. For
example, his discourse is pervaded by terms that discuss mastery of
our contexts, whether economic, political, military, ecological, or
interpersonal. Even his theory is reduced to serfdom, press-ganged
into the "service of radical democracy."216  It is, perhaps, because
of this instrumentalist hegemony that Unger puts so much emphasis
upon the importance of wealth and power, unduly prioritizing them
as the fundamental aspects of success, 217 thereby denying that things
could be otherwise.
All of these problems are compounded and exacerbated by
Unger's own vital insight into what he calls "the demonic problem of
politics: the tendency of means to create their own ends."218  If
conflict is the means, then conflict will be the end. Conflict has as
its central concern and effect inequality, for it is premised upon
adversariness and driven by the polarities of victory and defeat,
domination and subordination. If Unger is right, and I think he is,
that there is no social teleology, that although everything is up for
grabs, there is no guarantee that the future will necessarily turn out
to be positive, that "each advance towards greater plasticity and
disentrenchment creates new dangers of reversion to less revisable
and more oppressive orderings of social life,"219 and that the burden
is upon us as historically responsible social actors, then surely
contextualism and plasticity need some direction. The "relentless
imperative of plasticity 220 is not enough, for, as even he admits,
talented conservative reformers can use it to reinforce their
privilege.
Two brief examples help illustrate in a dramatic way the
political limitations of an unmodified plasticity. We will remember
that Unger is sanguine about the radical potential of the petty
216 See subtitle of False Necessity, supra, note 3.
217 That Unger believes militarism is necessary for statecraft becomes obvious when,
for example, he identifies achievement in "rule, production and war" as 'Worldly success."
Plastici, supra, note 6 at 102.
218 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 396.
219 Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 213.
220 Ibid. at 59.
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bourgeoisie mostly because of their innovative and experimental
tendencies, that is, their propensity for plasticity. Let us not forget,
however, that it was the petty bourgeoisie who also provided the
vanguard for European fascism. The second example, from the
Canadian context, is of particular relevance to women and other
disempowered groups. In the realm of constitutionalism, Unger
dislikes the arthritic system of checks and balances and favours a
process that will allow for rapid and effective decision-making that
can encourage "bold programmatic experiments. 221  Just such an
experiment in constitutional innovation took place at Meech Lake,
where a sort of super-council of "eleven men met in private in the
night while their limousines waited outside, engines running."2 22 The
result was an Accord that has a potentially massive impact upon the
politico-constitutional status of women, the northern territories, and
natives, absent their participation and, seemingly, oblivious to their
concerns.
223
Plasticity needs to be supplemented by a substantive vision,224
corrigible no doubt, that can provide us with guidance as to the
direction of our political, economic, and cultural reconstruction. In
particular, I think that the Ungerian project requires a revitalization
of his earlier strong conception of solidarity, a commitment to
seriously consider recent feminist contributions to politico-
jurisprudential discourse and praxis, and a dramatic expansion of his
221 Plasticity, supra, note 6 at 85.
222 R. McCarney, National Vice-President, Federal Liberal Party, quoted in "Critics Want
Chance to Press for Revisions" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (4 June 1987) at 11.
223 See generally, Promises, supra, note 189.
224 The suggestion in the text that Unger tends to favour process over substance is a
correlative of his anti-essentialist commitment, in that any substantive ideal continually
threatens to become a metaprinciple. The reproduction of this epistemological hierarchy is
manifest in, for example, the following comments on the relationship between contextualism
and equality.
We come to recognize the ideal of social equality, for example, as a partial, subsidiary
aspect of our effort to free ourselves from a social script that both subordinates us
unnecessarily to an overpowering scheme of class, communal, gender, and national
divisions and denies us as individuals, as groups, and as whole societies a greater
mastery over the institutional and imaginative contexts of our lives. This enlarged view
of the radical cause.
Social Theory, supra, note 6 at 7.
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conception of empowerment so as to make it less overdetermined by
juridicalism and more a cognate of freedom. In this way, it may be
possible to both reconnect solidarity and empowerment and
uncouple freedom and subordination. When I discuss solidarity and
the ethic of care, it is not to set up a new authoritarian orthodoxy,
a neo-naturalistic determining metaprinciple.225  Rather, they are
developed as corrigible, normative, and experiential bench-marks
intended to inspire and facilitate empowerment, helping us to
apprehend the reality of the other, as well as ourselves. 226 Thus,
although they are aspirational generative principles, they only
provide indications of the general direction in which we should
move, not authoritative right answers. z
27
Thus, contrary to his own guiding idea, Unger may have bought
into a necessitarian belief that conflict is inevitable, a credo that may
be traced to his androcentricity, his excessive predilection with
individual self-assertion, his fetishization of plasticity, his retreat from
solidarity, his ignorance of the ethic of care, and his over-
concentration on history to the exclusion of an alternative heritage.
Unger has failed to realize that perhaps one of the most pervasive
and recalcitrant elements of our contemporary formative contexts is
patriarchy, and has thus become a victim of his own myopia.
Indeed, the absence (or at least the underdevelopment) of a
reconstructive norm, such as solidarity in Politics, makes one wonder
if it may be no more than the restatement of the philosophical and
political origins of the Enlightenment, failing to persuade that the
Ungerian empowered democracy may be any less "solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish and short" than the Hobbesian Leviathan.
225 Which is, I suspect, the Ungerian response. As he says, "All clear-cut versions of
the naturalistic premise ... attribute to the personality some proper order of emotions, or of
virtues and vices." Ibid. at 24.
226 N. Noddings, Caring. A Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984).
227 The ethic of care may be already interstitially recognizable in the basic structure of
the welfare state, although severely bastardized, distorted, and instrumentalized by the
legitimizing imperatives of the late capitalist state and relegated to second fiddle behind
bureaucratic imperatives. But it may be accessible to deviationist development.
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F. Getting too Real. The Personal and the Political Revisited
A reflection on Unger's work over the last fifteen years
indicates that two central themes pervade his thinking:
contextualism and solidarity. However, their relationship has not
been constant. It, too, has been through the throes of modernism
a la Unger. Indeed, in Politics, it appears that, like everything else,
they are in conflict. The unfortunate result of such a
characterization of their relationship has been that contextualism has
emerged triumphant. This is because the "thesis of revisability"
insists that Unger refrain from replacing one totalizing and
repressive conception of humanity and society with another, for that
would be to invoke a "fantasizing, sentimental, archaic, tyrannical
prospect of devotion to a shared vision of the common good"2 28 or
what elsewhere he calls "a stifling despotism of virtue. 229
Of course, Unger is correct to be concerned about the
repression inherent in too thick a vision of the good society.
However, solidarity - even in its strongest sense - does not demand
the societal prostration that haunts Unger. Rather, solidarity
provides direction in the form of a moral theory that requires of us
that we respond to the needs of others at the same time as we
assert our contextualism. As the examples of the Meech Lake
Accord and the European petty bourgeoisie indicate, to the extent
that contextualism smothers solidarity, that may be the extent to
which contextualism slips into anti-democracy and, perhaps, even
eschatology. Thus, it seems to me that Unger's vision of the good
society, though not as anorexic as that of Rawls, is still too thin. If
he had not abandoned his more substantive conception of solidarity,
if he had shown some regard for the ethic of care, then he may
have been able to avoid the repressive hegemony of a totalizing
substantivism and, yet, have been able to provide us with an
evaluative bench-mark - corrigible, of course - by which to measure
our anti-necessitarism progress.
228 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 471.
229 Critical Legal Studies, supra, note 6 at 83.
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So, why has Unger retreated to such a radicalized neo-
proceduralism? Why has he surrendered so much critical
reconstructive ground? There are, I think, two not unconnected
reasons. First, although Unger is at pains to emphasize that "the
ultimate stakes in politics are the fine texture of personal
relations, 230 much of his analysis (and consequently many of his
proposals) are based upon a structural dichotomy between our
"practical" and "passionate" lives. Thus, while Passion and a
promised subsequent volume are focussed upon our nature and
potential as human beings, both as individuals and as members of
communities, Politics is primarily concerned with the reconstruction
of social institutions. The connection, of course, is that the
renovated institutional structure is designed to facilitate both our
potentials as human beings and more open interpersonal relations.2 31
However, I think this structural/discursive dichotomy has a
substantive impact, which I fear comes perilously close to
reproducing the old public/private dichotomy (Politics is war, Passion
is vulnerability) that has been thoroughly criticized by both critics
and feminists alike.
The reason for this structural - and perhaps unintentional -
reproduction of dualistic thought, I would conjecture, is to be
located in the politico-academic realm in which Unger finds himself.
It's all politics, is it not? Unger's earlier work had come under
repeated attack for its optimism, its "millenarian" tendencies,
"utopianism," as his detractors would say.232  In Politics, Unger
makes a serious effort to assuage the concerns of these critics by
distinguishing between utopian and speculative thought, claiming that
his enterprise comprises the former 6 ut not the latter. He posits
that his approach is dependent neither on too great a change in our
qualities as human beings, nor on too great a rupture with where we
are now. This recanting is also related to suggestions in Politics that
we cannot expect too much from our more extended forms of social
interaction and that we cannot expect altruism. I agree with Unger
230 False Necessity, supra, note 3 at 518.
231 See, e.g., ibid. at 398.
232 See, e.g., A. Leff, Book Review of Knowledge and Politics (1977) 29 Stan. L. Rev.
879; and E. Weinrib, "Enduring Passion" (1985) 94 Yale LJ. 1825.
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that a progressive political programme can be easily thwarted if it is
seen to be too idealistic. However, we must always be careful of
not allowing those who have power from setting the terms and the
parameters of the agenda, for that too will stymie the radical project.
If the mature, middle-aged Unger had retained his more substantive
conception of solidarity as outlined in his more juvenile Knowledge,
an aspiration that dovetails with some feminists' discussions of the
ethic of care, then the leap from here to there may not be so
dramatic. It might only need to take into consideration a
perspective that is already adopted, by at least some (how many?)
women. Feminism in both theory and practice exists here and now,
providing a vital - perhaps unique - opportunity to make the transi-
tion to the there and then. But, unfortunately, Unger ignores this
alternative vantage point. He is too cautious, too defensive, and
takes all too hasty a refuge in a politically problematic dichotomy
that reduces politics to the proceduralism of plasticity. Thus, rather
than capitulating to his pseudo-realist critics, Unger may have been
better advised to have pursued the politics of passion inspired by the
Atwoodian maxim of resistance: nolite te bastardes
carborundorum.233
VIL CONCLUSION
In this review, I have suggested that Unger can make a
significant contribution to a progressive politics, primarily through his
ability to connect empowerment and anti-domination with an agenda
for the disentrenchment of hierarchy, supplemented by both an
impressive institutional reconstruction and the foundations for a
freedom enhancing social theory. I have also argued that there is
a great deal in feminism that may dovetail with the spirit of the
Ungerian project. Most significantly, feminism's potential to provide
an alternative vision of the norms of socio-cultural interaction and
the possibility of historically and existentially locating the
transgressive dynamic that can engender an empowered democracy.
Between them, feminism and Unger provide us with an opportunity
233 M. Atwood, The Handmaid's Tale (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1985) at 62.
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(and that is all it is) to transcend the paradox of the Twilightenment
with its repressive paradox of freedom embedded in domination.
Having said that, the lacuna of not explicitly incorporating
feminism is not merely worrisome but positively disconcerting. Not
only is it almost incredible that a social theory developed in 1980s
- a theory that purports to be radical to boot - can pay so little
attention to the conditions of gender subordination. Moreover, in
ignoring the feminist perspective, Unger has missed a fruitful radical
opportunity to both learn and inspire.
By way of a closing comment, although I have discussed the
possibilities of a fruitful interchange between feminism and critical
theory, my aim is the contemplation of a coalition, not co-option.
Although I have suggested that there are important parallels
between these two progressive perspectives, there are also important
differences, primarily political differences, that cannot - and should
not - be ignored or assumed into irrelevancy. The idea pursued
here is something along the lines of what Iris Marion Young and
Jesse Jackson have described as a "rainbow coalition": where
alliances are celebrated and developed to progressive effect, while at
the same time differences are articulated, discussed, understood,
valued, and acted upon as a sign of progressive vibrancy and not as
factional weaknesses.234 I think the alternative to keeping the
conversation open between feminism and critical theory is
depressing: sectarianism, closure, stultification, continued marginality,
and disempowerment. 235
234 "Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral
and Political Theory' (1986) 5 Praxis International 381 at 398.
235 See also S. Farganis, "Social Theory and Feminist Theory: The Need for Dialogue"
(1986) 56 Sociological Inquiry 50; N. Fraser, "What's Critical About Critical Theory? The
Case of Habermas and Gender" (1985) 35 New German Critique 97; and R. Rorty, Philosophy
and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) at 378.
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